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ABSTRACT
The subject of this thesis is the distinction be
tween philosophy’ and the experimental sciences.

The part

of the problem studiedt is chiefly centred on the confusion
which exists between the legitimate field of research of
the philosophy of nature, and the legitimate orbit of the
experimental sciences#

The separation of these two in

tellectual disciplines engenders an examination of the
approach of each to sensible reality, their methods of in
vestigation, and. the types of knowledge which they achieve.
The problem, in its major aspect, is primarily
historical, since the majority of the scholars preceding
Galileo directed their efforts toward the solving of the
riddles of the universe mainly by philosophical speculation;
whereas, with the complete enunciation of the experimental
method, the moderns sought to discover the truth contained
in reality by the scientific method.

Sine® they were un

aware that the new method was limited to the observable
and measurable, they firmly believed that they had discovered
a new means for philosophical speculation.

As was inevitable,

the limits of scientific knowledge were defined by scientists
such as Mach and Poincare*

Unfortunately, they chose to

reject the possibility of any knowledge which did not lie
within the scope of the experimental method.

ill
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The cause of traditional philosophy was eclipsed,
hut not annihilated,

The result has been a major division.

On the one hand, the advocates of Thoraisra, together with
such prominent men of science as Caldin, Conant, Owen, and
Thompson have acknowledged the aim Mid validity of tra
ditional philosophy.

On the other hand, the materialists,

pragmatists, and positivists rejected traditional philo
sophy and preferred to found their philosophies on the
theories of science.

It has bean at this point, in order

to salvage any possibility of a philosophy anchored to
reality, that Maritain and his contemporaries have expan
ded and applied a study of the nature of philosophy and the
natural sciences, so that it would be possible to separate
them, and place each on® in its particular position in a
well ordered hierarchy of knowledge.
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I
INTRODUCTION
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The failure to distinguish philosophy and the ex
perimental sciences has been one of the major reasons for
the intellectual chaos to be found in the contemporary world.
Certain schools of thought, following in the tradition of
Herbert Spenser and August Comte, have sought to resolve this
controversial question by denying the validity of traditional
philosophy and, therefore, rejecting it.

For they assumed

that, since the philosophical method of their Greek and
Scholastic predecessors had failed to solve certain scien
tific problems to which it had been applied, it must neces
sarily be invalidated as a means of discovering any knowledge.
So, for a long time, the experimental sciences and their
method remained as the only recognized means for achieving
a real and valid knowledge.

Other schools of thought,

following in the tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aqu
inas, have recognised philosophy, the validity of its pro
cedure, and its contributions to the growth of ma n ’s know
ledge.

Accordingly, they have tried to re olve t his problem

by placing philosophy and the experimental sciences in their
proper positions within a well-defined hierarchy of knowledge,
and affording to each the recognition to which it is due.
1
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2
Since neither of these alternate solutions is universallyaccepted, the distinction between what is philosophical and
what is scientific remains as one of the principal problems
to confront contemporary thought,
If we turn to the historical aspects of the distin
ction between philosophy and the experimental sciences, we
will discover that this problem did not arise with the
Ancients because their whole effort was devoted to the organi
zation of the philosophy of nature as a science distinct
from metaphysics,

This was achieved with admirable success.

However, as M, Maritain has pointed out, the Ancients, Aris
totle and the early scholastics paid for this capital truth
by a serious intellectual error.

They did not ignore the

detail of phenomena but failed to perceive that this d etail
of phenomena needed its own specific science which would be
distinct from philosophy.

The Ancients, in their optimism,

were often prone to arrive quickly at what were oftentimes
very hypothetical or fallacious explanations for the details
of sensible nature•

Philosophy and the experimental sciences

were one, and all the sciences concerned with the material
world were sub-divisions of one unique specific science
called the philosophy of nature.

The philosophy of nature

was a science to which it belonged at once to analyze cor
poreal substances and to explain rainbows, and therefore,it
absorbed all the natural sciences.

For the Ancients, the

detail of phenomena was not the object of a specifically

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

distinct science^,

this does not Imply that the episterao-

logy of the philosophy of the Ancients did not allow for a
definite relationship of the material sciences with philo
sophy but simply states that the method peculiar to the ex
perimental sciences was not elaborated.
the scholastics who followed the Ancients continued
to direct their efforts toward the separation of the philo
sophy of nature from metaphysics.

they wore also aware of

the methods of analysis of natural phenomena in certain fields
such as optics and astronomy} but they did not, in a clear
cut way, concaive of the possibility of a general science of
the sensible specifically distinct fro® the philosophy of
nature.

They still continued to interpret natural phenomena

frost a point of view essentially ordered to an ontological

Jacques marit&in. la Philosophic de la Mature
^
(Paris: Pierre Tequi, 1935)
Jl. "Youtefots, rcette"verite
capitals %tait payee che# lea anciens chm Aristotle luiet ches lea ancient* scholastlques hgalesent au prix
dlim e grave f&ute do precipitation intalleetuella. On ne
pout pas dire que les anclens talent incurieux du detail
d m ph&mumma t ils s*y intereaaant mutant queries ^modernea,
mats' ils ntavaient pas vu que ce detail des phenotaenes exige
sa science i lul sa science speeifique, distincte opecifiqueiaont, (ye m dis pas generiqueaentjf do la philosophic de
la nature. Pour 1*optimisms des anclcns que ae portalt, tiles
rapideiaent i. cles raisons d *etro quelquefois tres hypotheblq'Ues
quand 11 s ’&giss&it du detail d m phfenoraanas, philosophic ...et
sciences experimentals 'etaxent un seul et imme aavoir, et'.
toutes les sciences du aond material '©talent des subdivisions
d ,un.e seulo et. unique science soeciflQue qui s’appelerait
’philosophic naturalist, et
laquelle aoourtenaiant i la fois
1*explication de la substance des corps et 1 Texplication de
l*arc en ciel. On pout dire que pour les ©nolens la phi!©- ,
sophie da la nature" a baorbait toutqa las sciences da la na
ture. he detail d©s'r”> K
''pas''
“pour eux l*objet d*une explication scianbifiqu* speciflquement distincte.”
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knowledge.

Thus questions which today are called scientific

did not constitute a specifically distinct discipline but
were a part of philosophy.

This continued to be the case

right down to the seventeenth century.
The emancipation of the experimental sciences was
not sudden and abrupt,but gradually moved forward through the
initial efforts of men such as Francis Bacon, Copernicus, and
Kepler.

Francis Bacon is credited by history2 as one of the

first advocates of induction, as the principal means to a
valid knowledge of the sensible.

Although modern scientists

value the contributions of Bacon and his contemporaries, they
consider that their unique science had its inception with the
seventeenth century scientist, Galileo.

In Galileo, the new

movement reached further than in any of his predecessors.
With a solid foundation in the new principles, he combined
the experimental methods of Gilbert with mathematical dedu
ction and thus discovered and established the true method of
the physical sciences.3

2 Frank fhilly, A History of Philosophy (New fork:
Henry % l t and Company, 1949) , pp.""' 259~26>2.
^ W.C. Dampier - Whetham, A History of Science (Lon
don : Cambridge University Press, 1^30), p. 141. "In Galileo
the new spirit went further than in any of his predecessors.
With a sound grasp of the new principles he learned the
modern need of concentration and worked out his carefully de
limited problems in a more completely and methodical way than
the universal genius of Leonardo could stoop to accomplish...
But above all he combined the experimental methods of Gilbert
with mathematical deduction, and thus discovered and estab
lished the true method of physical science.”
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In general, the new procedure of the natural
sciences is a combination of the experimental method and
mathematical deduction.

More specifically, Galileo’s theory

and practice of the scientific method can be expressed in
three phases.

The first is observation; the second is an ex

plicative hypothesis in the form of a mathematical law; the
third is the verification of the hypothesis.

Galileo, because

of this contribution, warn the real initiator of scientific in
duction as the moderns themselves understand it.

However,

mathematics is not in Galileo what it becomes in Descartes,
where it is the first principle of all natural philosophy^.
The new approach to the explanation of natural pheno
mena, as instituted by Galileo, adopts the following analy
tical procedure.

In a controlled system, certain observations

concerning a specified natural process are recorded by means
of Instruments and measurements.

This record of observations

contains the relevant measured values of those variable magni
tudes which characterise the process under investigation.
These measured values are carefully examined to determine

^ J. Marechal, Precis D ’Histolre de La Philosophie
Moderns (Louvain: Museu, ^Les3airiura,n',l^,
3l3),l,, 1, 43'. HSa Theorie
et sa pratique de la methods e perimentale selon les trois
phases typiques: observation, - hypothdae explicative en
for,me de la loi mathematique, - verification de I ’hypothese.
11 fut par Id le veritable initiateur de 1*induction scientifique telle que l ’entendront les modernes. Pourtant le
matheraatisme n ’est point encore chez Galilee ce qui’il deviendra chez Descartes: la princip® de toute la fhilosophie
naturelle.”
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whether or not there is a relationship*

If a relationship

is discovered, it is enunciated by a function which des
cribes the pertinent relationship*

The resultant generali

zation of explanation is tested as to its validity by an
application to a particular process within its jurisdiction.
If successful, it is formally stated as a law.^
With the explicit development of the experimental
method, the progress of the natural sciences began*

Fore

most among the group of distinguished scholars of science
who applied the analytical procedure to the investigation
of the material world was Isaac lewton.

Among his many con

tributions to the growth of the sciences was a functional
analysis of the experimental method in order to show its
range of application,

dust as Galileo had previously, New

ton also affirmed that the analytical method deals with ex
perimentation , the observation of phenomena, and through
these, the development of general conclusions arrived at
through induction.

Furthermore, the scientist does not

admit any objections to his conclusions unless they arise
from other experiments.

If no objections arise to nullify

the conclusion, it is affirmed as universal.

Should further

experimentation reveal something witich in part contradicts

5 This summary of Galileo’s method is based on cer
tain conclusions reached by Moritz Schlick, Vide Moritz
Schlick, Philosophy of Nature, trans, Arnethe Von Zeppelin,
(New Xork: Philosophical Library, 1949), pp. 18-20.
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the conclusion, it is restated to include those changes
necessitated by the new discovery.

Through the analytical

procedure, the scientist can determine the simpler consti
tuents of composite bodies; he can determine the laws of
motion; and in the universe he can determine causes from
effects, the general causes from the particular causes, and
therefore finally arrive at the most general causes^.

in

accord with these principles of procedure, «ewton and his
contemporaries continued their experimentation and instituted
many advances in the physical sciences.
It this point It is Interesting to observe that hewton and his contemporaries did not clearly preceive the uni
queness of this new scientific knowledge and so believed that
they were philosophizing; they were completely unaware that
they were pioneers within the realm of a new intellectual
discipline, distinct from philosophy.

The confidence of

this new scientific age In its procedure is expressed by
Cotes, a friend of Newton.

So certain were these men of

Isaac uewton, Phllosophta “atnralis. Trincioia Mathe
matics (London: 1686), hlcT'Tl" "^rop. 2, pT' 237. ‘’’
^ttetHodus
anaiyticus est experimenta capere, phaenomena observare, indegu#'conclusiones -enerales induction® inferre, nec ex adverse
ullas objectiones adraittere, nisi quae vel ab experimentis
vel allis certis veritatibus desuraanfcur ........ . ........
Quod si ex phaenomenis nihil quod contra opponi possit exoriatur eorjclusio inferri poterit universalis. Et si quando in
experiundo pastes reperiatur qliquid quod a parte contrari
faciat, turn deura non sine istus exceptionibus affi rmetur conclusio opporteblt. Mac anal si licebit, ex compositis rebus
ratiocination® colleger® siwplices; ex motibus vires movantes;
et in universum ©x effect is causes, ex causis oarticularibus
generales donee ad generalissimus tandem sit deventum."
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a
science that they were engaged in a new mode of philosophical
speculation that they completely rejected the doctrine of
Aristotle and the Peripatetics as barren and invalid*
Furthermore, they believed that through this synthetic and
analytical method the laws and forces of nature could be
deduced from certain selected phenomena, and that this method,
in its broadest extension, would provide the means through
whiCh the causes of all things could be derived from the
simplest principles possible
At this point in history a reversal has arisen in
the position of philosophy and the experimental sciences.
On the one hand the Ancients had considered philosophy and
the natural sciences as one intellectual discipline principally
because they had failed to perceive that the detail of

? A. Cotes, "Preface to the Second Edition," Isaac
Newton, Mathematical Principles, trans. A. % t t e , rev. F* Cajori {B e r H e y 'WmLii 1 ' ' ve'rsity of California Press, 1946),
p. xx. "The sum of the doctrine of the schools derived from
Aristotle and the Peripatetics is heroin contained. They af
firm that the several effects of bodies arise from the par
ticular natures of those bodies; but whence it is that bodies
derive those naturef, they do not tell us, and therefore tell
us nothing ............................. . . . . . . . . . .
There is left then the third class which profess experimental
philosophy. These Indeed derive the causes of all things fro®
the most simple principles possible, but then they assume no
thing as a principle that is not proved by phenomena. They
frame no hypothesis, nor receive them into philosophy other
wise than as questions whose truth may be disputed. They pro
ceed therefore, in a twofold method synthetical and analytical.
From some selected phaenoiaena they deduce by analysis the
fofces of nature and the more complete laws of forces, and
from thence by synthesis shew the constitution of the rest.
This is the incomparably best way of philosophizing."
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phenomena needed its own specific science distinct from
philosophy and because the experimental method was yet to be
completely enunciated*

Thus all the sciences concerned with

the material world were considered as subdivisions of the
philosophy of nature*

On the other hand, the scientists of

the seventeenth century had discovered the principles and
procedure essential to the study of the detail of phenomena,
but believed this to be a new method of philosophizing.
Galileo and Newton, together with their contemporaries had
failed to recognize the unique nature of philosophy and con
sequently believed their efforts to be philosophical.

As a

consequence, although,the method of the physical sciences had
been enunciated, all the sciences were included together under
what was termed experimental philosophy.

In the one instance

the Ancients had absorbed science into philosophy, and now
philosophy was absorbed into the physical sciences by the
scientists, and so the confusion between philosophy and the
physical sciences remained.
With the continuous progress of the experimental
sciences there was a growing awareness among many scientists
such as Mach and Poincare" of the unique nature of scientific
knowledge.

Mach, in seeking to analyze scientific knowledge,

began with sensible nature, which is the object studied in
the natural sciences.

From his investigations Mach concluded

that the basic elements of nature are sensations.

He be

lieved that primitive man first picked out certain compounds
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of these sensations which were relatively stable, so that
the first and oldest words are names of things..

This sale-*

etion was accomplished through the process of abstraction,
abstractions fro® the environment of things, and fro® their
continual minor fluctuations which pass unnoticed.

Further

more unalterable things, as such do not exist, but are ab
stractions.

The name is but a symbol for a compound of ele

ments from whose changes we abstract*

A single word is

assigned, to a whole compound to suggest all constituent ele
ments at once.

Mach emphasises that sensations are not the

signs of things, rather, a thing is a though symbol for a
compound sensation of relative fixedness#

The world is not

composed of things but of flux and sensations such as colours,
tones, and. pressure, and in view of this, it is impossible
to affirm either permanence of the thing-in-i taelf .

ft

Since

Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics, fcrans., T.J.
McCormack {La Salle, Illinois's"''Spen ffourt iXibXishing Co.,
1942)* PP» 57d-iO* ’’Nature is composed of sensations as its
elements'. Primatlve man, however first picks out certain
compounds of these elements - those namely that are relatively
permanent and of greater importance to him. The first and
oldest words are names of things. Even here there is an ab
stractive process, an abstraction from the surroundings of
things and from the continual minor fluctuations which these
compounds undergo, which being practically unimportant are
not noticed. So unalterable thing exists. The thing is an
abstraction, the name symbol for a compound of elements from
whose changes we abstract. The reason we assign a single
word to a whole compound is that we need to suggest all the
constituent sensations at once, When later we come to remark
about the changeableness we cannot at the same time hold fast
to the idea of the permanence of & thing unless we have re
course to the conception of the thing itself or other such like
absurdity* Sensations are not the signs of things, but on
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Mach was also in agreement with “ ewton and Cotes in that he
considered the experimental method as the only real and valid
means of knowledge, his episteraology represented a real at
tempt to discover and analyze the nature of scientific know
ledge*

On this basis he concluded that sensations or the

detail of phenomena and their connections formed the basis
for scientific, knowledge and that experience alone is the
means of this knowledge*

The;,natural sciences, according to

Mach, could not reach any inner natures because they did not
exist, rather, it discovered and described the connections of
the not further analyzable elements of sensations.
Since ^&ch realized that the physical sciences are
limited to a certain approach in their study of natural pheno
mena, he also sought to fit the terms of the experimental
sciences to this approach*

In trying to achieve this, he

attempted to purify terns, such as causality, of their pre
vious philosophical meanings.

He considered the concept of

cause significant only as a means of provisional knowledge
or orientation.

Thus, the scientist, in his investigation

of an event, must regard phenomena as dependent on one ano
ther in the same manner as a geometrician regards the sides
and angles of a triangle as dependent on one another*?.

the contrary a thing is a thought symbol for a compound sen
sation of relative fixedness. Properly speaking the world is
not composed of ''things” as its elements but of colours, tones,
pressures, spaces, times, in short what we ordinarily call in
dividual sensations."
9 Ibid., p. 5&2.

"The notion cause possesses signi-
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Mach*® description of causality expresses a concrete atteraot
to purify the content of the physical sciences of previous
philosophical concepts.

Because his eoistemology expresses

an awareness of the limits of scientific knowledge, he marks
an advance over many of his predecessors*
Henri Poincare", the French mathematician, also made
a similar study of the physical sciences and formulated cer
tain conclusions about the nature of the natural sciences.
He considered the physical sciences to be a classification
of facts which appearances separate., It is a union of these
facts as though they were bound together by some natural and
hidden kinship of force.

Basically, the physical sciences

are systems of relationships.

Poincare also concluded? that

the objectivity of the experimental sciences is in these
relationships and these relationships alone have objective

. 10 ,

value

ficance only as a means of provisional knowledge or orien
tation. In any exact or profound investigation of an event,
the inquirer must regard phenomena as dependent on one another
in the same way as the geometer regards the sides and angles
of a triangle as dependent on one another.M
tn
Henri Poincare, The Foundations of Science, trans*
George Bruce Halstead (Lancaster 'I1®.'i' fhe' Science i’ress, 1946),
p- 349. wKow what is Science? . . . It is before all a classi
fication, a wanner of bringing together facts which appearan
ces separate though they were bound together by some natural
and hidden kinship. Science In other words is a system of
relationships, k o w « e have just said, it is in the relations
alone that objective value since it teaches us only
relations, this is to reason backwards since it is precisely
these relations alone which can be regarded as objective.”
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Thus*Poincare also affirms the concept that the physical scien
ces are a study of relationships among phenomena and that
these relationships ar© gained through experience.

There is

no thought of seeking the inner nature of things,but only
the discovery and description of phenomena, and their rela
tionships.

These form the basis for a real and valid scien

tific knowledge.
The thought of !4ach and Poincare' illustrates the
growing awareness of the specific limits of the experimental
method as an instrument of knowledge.

In its fundamental

approach, the method has remained the same in its three
typical phases: observation, an explicative hypothesis, and
the verification of the hypothesis.

But, its limitation to

the discovery and description of the relationships and the
detail of phenomena has been clarified.

The experimental

sciences no longer persist in an attempt to solve every pro
blem in the universe.

Thus, the inner natures of things no

longer form a problem in the physical sciences.

This aware

ness of the unique nature of the natural sciences has seen
the meanings of terms such as causality removed from their
previous philosophical definitions and their restatement
within the limits of the experimental sciences.
Although some of the limitations of the physical
sciences had been clarified, the confusion between philosophy
and the experimental sciences still remained:for many of the
major scientists still considered scientific knowledge alone
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as real and valid, and recognised only the experimental
method as an instrument* of knowledge*

1‘hey had failed to

recognise the unique nature of philosophy and considered
traditional philosophy as the product of an obsolete pro
cedure*

So strong was the faith of many philosophers in

the progress of science that they constructed whole systems
of philosophy on the tenets and interpretations of the phy
sical sciences.
As Fulton Sheen has pointed out, many philosophers
to-day take generally accepted results of the experimental
sciences and wepve them together to fans & picture of reality.
Furthermore, Sheen noted that all philosophers do not philo
sophize in the same way, and therefore, philosophy no longer
seeks truth but forms points of view in line with the latest
scientific trend.

In !Mt®head*s philosophy there in a de

finite break with the mechanistic view, and the fomstion
of an org&nlaaie concept of reality.

Lloyd Morgan and S.

Alexander express the view that there is a movement toward
higher levels of being.

In Santayanna there is a naturalism

which is Platonic in spirit.

These are examples of philoso

phers who are no longer conscious of their own intrinsic
value.

They have no higher mission except to apply the cate

gories of the material to the spiritual, and the spatiotemporal to the eternal*^.

In this currant state philosophies

^ Fulton 1, Sheen, Philosophy of Science. (Milwaukee!
Bruce Publishing Go., 1934)$ p p . 21-24. "To take the gradually
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became an enumeration of personal points of view based on
current scientific doctrines.

The contention still remains

that the experimental sciences are the only sound foun
dations for all knowledge.

Traditional philosophy is still

considered the product of an obsolete procedure.
The development of philosophy as a valid science
distinct from the experimental sciences has been slow and
faltering outside the reqlm of the
thought.

Ihomistic school of

But it has been materially aided by a definite

realization of the incomplete picture of reality presented
by the experimental sciences alone.

The result has been

a concerted effort by men such as Caldin, Owen, Thompson,
and other prominent scientists to distinguish between
philosophy and the natural sciences.

accepted results of the various sciences, »
. .and
to weavethem
them together in a picture of reality seems
the readiest and
safett way of philosophising.
And this is precisely the
method many philosophers follow today . . .
But not
all philo
sophers synthesis® in the same manner and hence one
must not
look for truth but only for "points of view". This makes
philosophy equivalent to the enumeration of personal points of
view, and Professor Overstreet is not unwilling to embrace
this confusion worse confounded. To-day on the contrary in
one outstanding philosopher after another we find forceful
expressions of points of view in line with newer trends. In
Whitehead for example, we discover a definite break with the
mechanistic views and the formation of an o r g a n i s m c concept
of reality. In Lloyd Morgan and S. Alexander we are given as
over against the entropic philosophy of materialism, the view
of a world in which there is a nlaua toward higher levels of
being. In bantayanna we find a naturalism that is neverthe
less Platonic in spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
These are but'a few specimens of a philosophy which is
no longer conscious of its own intrinsic worth, and which so®
no; higher mission in life for itself, than applying the cate
gories of material to the spiritual, of the physical to the
mental and the category of the spatio-temporal to the eternal."
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Within the Thomistie tradition# the philosophy of nature has
been revitalised and its formal and material objects re
affirmed to show that there can be e philosophical knowledge
of natural phenomena*

Thonistic philosophy does not seek to

supersede the proper operations of the scientific wethod; hut
it does contend that traditional philosophy is a legitimate
science which gains a knowledge of reality which is as real
and valid as scientific knowledge.
In its historical aspects the distinction between
philosophy and the physical sciences has, as a problem for
contemporary thought, resolved itself into two broad opposing
groups.

The one group, because they have failed to recognise

the unique nature of traditional philosophy, have rejected
It as the invalid product of an obsolete method.

They have

maintained since the birth of the experimental method and
scientific tradition that this procedure alone is capable of
discovering real knowledge.

More recently, the need for

philosophical speculation has become more apparent.

And so

the philosophers within this group have sought to develop
their systems by beginning with the most recent accepted
scientific doctrine,

Within their systems they have com

pletely rejected any concepts of substance, nature or caus
ality as founded in traditional philosophy.

Some of the

more prominent members of this group are the naturalists, the
pragmatists, and the dialectical materialists.
The other group recognises the value and purpose of
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traditional philosophy and the value and the accomplishments
of the experimental sciences*

They recognize the incomplete

picture of reality offered by either science or philosophy
when alone.

Therefore;they seek to form a more complete

picture of reality by distinguishing between the proper
field of operations for each; they seek to restare order by
placing each in its proper position within the hierarchy of
knowledge and affording to each the recognition to which it
is due.

Most prominent in this group are those philosophers

such as Maritain, Caldin, Owen* Thompson, Renoirte and others
who follow in the tradition of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.
Since neither of these alternate solutions is universally
accepted the distinction between what is philosophical and
what is scientific has remained as one of the principal pro
blems to confront contemporary thought*
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II
THE APPROACH OF PHILOSOPHY AHD SCIENCE
TO SENSIBLE NATUR8
With the development of the material sciences and
their marked success in the solution of many of the problems
of nature, there has been a deep and wide-spread influence
to the point where it has been reflected in a new usage
and meaning for many terms such as principle, causality,
and substance.

Confusion has resulted from the failure to

distinguish the legitimate spheres of philosophy and the
science.

In actual fact, it is not, as some thinkers such

as Comte and Spenser contend, a question of the new scien
tific meaning for a tern superseding a philosophical meaning
considered obsolete because it had been defined prior to
the new approach.

Esther, this problem revolves around

the more basic issue of the distinction between philosophy
and the natural sciences.

In this instance, the distinction

is concerned with the question of the basic approach of
each intellectual discipline to the study of reality.

With

in philosophy itself there is one part, the philosophy of
nature, which is specifically directed to the same object
of study as the natural sciences.

Both are concerned with

mobile being but each seeks to penetrate it from a differen,
point of view.

The clarification of these points of view

or formal objects is essential to the clear understanding
IB
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of the line dividing philosophy and the experimental
sciences.
In regard to these different approaches, it. rlaritain
has pointed out that in the philosophy of nature the mind
searches for the inward nature and intelligible reasons of
things.

In following this approach, the mind comes to the

statement of notions like corporeal substance, quality,
operative potency, material and formal causes, and other
similar concepts,

although all of these notions apply to

the world of the observable, they do not describe objects
which in themselves are representable by the senses, or ex
pressible in an image or spatio-temporal scheme.

These con

cepts are not defined by observations or measurements which
can be performed in a particular determined way.
Furthermore,

riaritain also indicated that philo

sophy is ever present in the emperiological explanation.

The

scientist, like every other man, remains invincibly ontolo
gical, but in this case the ontology is oblique and indirect.
For a scientist, doing is never sought for itself; it is
only there as a basis for empiric definition and of physico
ma thematic al entities-**.

Thus, within the philosophy of

'

Jacaues war i tain, tea Degres Pat da voir (Paris:
Descl^e D e Brouwer et Cie, 19161", pp. 2M~2$9. " I I va
sans dire qua 1 *explication ontologique 1 *etre rest© considere (pour autant q u ’on demeure corame dans le present®
degre d*abstraction) en ordre aux dorrn^s sensible et ob
servables. riais l f®spirit s*y porte pour en chercher la
nature intime et les intelligibles c’est pourquoi il arrive
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nature there is a definite interest in changing being, not
in the detail of phenomena, but in intelligible being itself
as mutable or changeable.

The material obj ct of the philo

sophy of nature is mobile being and its formal object is
the intelligible aspects of mobile being.
As M, B r i t a i n has Indicated, the resolution of con
cepts is made in an infra-philosophie direction within the
natural sciences.
point of interest.

What things are in themselves is not the
What is important are the possibilities

of empiric proof and mensuration which these things repre
sent, and the connecting together, according to certain
stable laws, of the data furnished by these means.

Every

definition must he made no longer *by the nearest gender
and specific difference 1 as in philosophy, but by observable
and highly determined measurable properties.

For the ex

perimental sciences the possibility of observation and

en suivant cette route a des notions comrae cell© de substance
corporelle de qualite, de puissance operative de cause raaterielle ou formelle etc., qui tout en se rapportant au stonde ob
servable ne designent pas des objets qui soient eux-raemes representables au sens et fexprlraables dans un image ou dans un
scheme apatio-temporel; ces objets ne son! pas definis par
des observations au des mensurations a effectues de telle
faeon determinee.
f
,
3 Dans 1*explication 'empireologlque d*autre part, il y a
encore comrae nous les notions a*1*instant, de 1*ontologique
puisqu* il s*agit d ’une connaissance intellectuelle, et quo
pour faire de la science experimentale nous ne devenons pas
des animaux sans raison; en ce sens le savant comme toute
homme rests rive a l fontologie mais il n*y a la d*ontologie
qu1indirectement et obliquement. L ’ontologie n*est jamais
laK degage pour lui mthae, il n*est In' qu*av titre de fondemont
de representations et definitions empiriques ou d ’entitds
psycio-mathemat iques.M
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measurement replaces the essence of quiddity sought for
In things by philosophy2 *

thus, observation and measure

ment underlie all the natural sciences either implicitly
or explicitly! the natural sciences have for their material
object mobile being, and for their formal object the ob
servable and measurable aspects of mobile being*
Inasmuch as both the scientific and the philosophic
adopt a different approach to the study of nature, the re
sult has been a development of new meanings for terms which
nominally appear alike in the technical 1 exikons of both
philosophy and the experimental sciences*

At this point it

is necessary to guard against the erroneous assumption that
the scholars prior to the formal statement of the scientific
method were completely ignorant of the experimental sciences*
This was not the case*

On the other hand, with the complete

enunciation of the new approach to nature, terms such as

Ibid*« P« 292. "Ainsi done d 1un® faqon generals,
dans tout ce registre eapiriologique la resolution des con
cepts se fait dans une direction infra-philosophique. Cs
n*est pas a*ce que lea chosea aont en elles-meae qu *on s*
interests®; ce qu*import®, «© sont les poasihllities de constation espiriqu® et de mensuration qu’elles representent,
e’est aussi la possibilite de relier entre ©lies, selon cer
tain®® lois stables, les donnes fournier par ces constitu
tions et mensurations; tout® definition deva se fair®, non
plus *par le genre prochain et la difference specifique,
rn&is par des propriety's observables et raesurables bien de
termines dont on assignors dans chaque cas les taoyens de roperage et d® verification pratique. La possibilit© d*obser
vation et do mensuration reaplac® ainsi pour un tel savoir
I ’essence ou quiddite cherchee dans les choses par la philo
sophic*"
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matter, substance, and casuality did receive new scientific
meaning?,meanings which served to exemplify the characteri
stics of the scientific method and approach.

In some in

stances, the philosophical and scientific meanings parallel
each other, but their basic differences can be ascertained
by a comparison of their usages within philosophy and the
experimental sciences,

1 , Substance
Within Thomistie philosophy, there is a division
of the modes of being into ten predicaments.

These pre

dicaments themselves are divided into two major parts which
are substance and accident.

In respect to the predicament

substance, St. Thomas affirmed that ”it belongs to the quiddity
of essence of a substance to exist or to be not in a sub
ject *”3

in a further clarification of this philosophical

concept,

Marltain stated that a substance is a thing or

nature that can exist by itself or in virtue of itself and
not in another thing, that is to say a previously existing
subject.

Substance signifies a thing existing in itself or

subsisting, so that it is self-contained as an existent

Thoma a Aquinas, Sum iaa Thep.logiae ( O t t a w a : Impensis
Studii Generalis 0. Pr., 19M>}» I l i , q 7 7 , a.l, ad2. "Non
est ergo definitio substantiae: ens per se sine subiecto,...
sod quidditati seu essentiae substantiae competit habere
esse non in subiecto.”
3
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thing^.

It should be noted that the classifications of

the predicaments is not arbitrary, but is fully grounded on
the various kinds of beings which are found in the real order.
Therefore, the idea of substance represents something that
really exists.
In its scientific usage, substance is the term ap
plied to homogeneous forms of matter - that is, those forms
that are alike in all their parts.

Iron, water, and carbon

dioxide qualify as homogeneous forms of matter or substance
because observation shows them to be alike in all their
parts.

Other common materials such as granite, and soil

show differences in various parts even to superficial ob
servation, whereas, other materials such as gun powder, or
pieces of cast iron, while apparently of uniform composition,
show similar differences of structure when viewed under a
microscope.

Such mixtures are not homogeneous and therefore

are not substances.^

^ Jacques Maritain, "Introduction Generale A La Philosophie,” Elements Be Philosophic (Parist Pierre Tequi, 1930),
1,-160. "Mous dirons done que la substance eat une chose ou
une nature faite pour exister par sol ou a raison de soi (per
se) - et non pas en autre chose.'"'^n'alxo'.‘'''‘c1*est3*dlre en
sujet dega pose dans' i"'*eter 77. Ce que Hesigne le terme sub
stance c*est une chose faite pour exister en soi ou pour sub
sister, e ’est a dire se tenlr en elle ra^rae en existant."
5 L. Richardson and A. Scarlett, General College Chemi
stry (**ew forks Henry Holt and Co., 1947), p. 1. "Substance
is the term ap lied by chemists to homogeneous forms Of
matter - that is, those that are alike in all their parts.
» 7 i r o n , water and carbon dioxide are substances. On the
other hand, such common materials as granite, soil, a mince
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In conformity with the difference between the philo
sophical and the scientific approach to reality, the term
substance has two different applications.

The philosophical

meaning of substance is indicative of a mode of being, and
although it is derived from and is applicable to the world
of the sensible, it does not describe something which is
itself representable by the senses or expressible in an
image or spatio-temporal scheme.

The scientific usage of

substance to denote homogeneous forms of matter is derived
from the world of the observable, and it is both applied and
verified by direct observations and measurements made within
the sensible order.
2.

Accident

In its philosophical application, the tern accident
includes certain diverse modes of being which have a common
factor.

According to St. Thomas an accident is l!a thing to

which it is due *to be* in another” ,^

Therefore its essence

pie. even to superficial observation show differences in
various parts, whereas other materials such as grains of gun
powder or pieces of cast iron, while apparently of uniform
composition, under the microscope show similar differences
of structure* Such mixtures are not homogeneous, and thus,
in the strict chemical sense are not substances.”

6 Thomas Aquinas, Goiaaentum In wuator Id boos Sententiarum Marxistrl Petri Lombardi. iV, 'foist. £11.' q'lfo 1 Opera
fomnia.,'ftarmae ed, (Mew York; Rlsurgia, 1949)» ¥11-1 - 632.
*7..“res cui debetur esse in alioj et hoc numquam separatur
ab aliquo accident®, nee separari potest: quia illi rei quae
est accidens, secundum rationem suae quidditatis semper de
betur esse in alio.”
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is to inhere in another as in a subject.

These accidents

are finite natures which exist or are able to exist and
manifest reality proportionate to the manner of predication.
Within philosophy, the accident quantity is con
sidered from the viewpoint of a mode of being; the quantity
of a mobile being Is its extension.
contracted in one point.

Mobile being is not

It has parts soread out in three

dimensions in space so that one part is in this part of
space and another part is In another part of space*

This

quantity is defined by St. Thomas as; '’that which is divisible
into two or ©ore constitutent parts of which each is by
nature a ’one 1 and 'a this*R .7

Quantified being is there

fore a being which has divisible parts; it is a whole being
which is actually undivided but capable of being divided
into parts; It is actually one, a unit, but potentially many.
Outside philosophy, the accident quantity is con
sidered in two ways.

The first, as M. Maritain has pointed

out, is in mathematics.

Here the mind considers the aspects

of a body which remain when the sensibles are abstracted.
Numbers and extension are objects of thought which cannot
exist without sensible matter, but can be conceived without

? Thomas Aquinas, In *'4etaohysicam Ari st ot el 1sCoamentaria. ed. M.R. Cathala Ihaurlhi Italia: fiarii E. Marietti,
IS&5TTK.
!•«*. 15, c. 13, p. 310. "Quantum vero dicitur quod est divisible in ea quae insunt, quorum utrumque
aut singulum, unum aliquid, et hoc aliquid, aptura naturn est
esse.”

ASSUMPTION UNI1/ERSITY W;:’ *
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it.

The knowled e of quantity in its relations of order

and measurement forms the intellectual discipline of Biathe
ft
matics.
The second, as
-4aritain has indicated, is in
physi eo-mathematics.

Physico-matheiaatics is a scientia

media, an intermediary science half-way between mathematics
and empirical natural science, of which the physically real
forms the subject matter in regard to the measurements which
it allows us to draw from it, but whose formal object and
conceptual equipment remains mathematical.

It is a science

which Is materially physical and formally mathematical.9
In its philosophical aspect, quantity is considered in its
relation to being as a mode of being.

In mathematics It is

considered In terms of its relations of order and measurement;

J. *iaritain, lea Degree Du Savoir. p. 72. "Celle
qui rest© quand tout le sensible est torabe - la quantite, nombre
ou etendu paris en sois objet de pensee qui ne peut pas JSXiater sans la matiere sensible, mala qui peut etre conca sans
elle car rien de sensible... C*est le grand domain© de la
Mathematica. Connaisoance de la Quantite common© telle, selon
les’relations d fordre et de raesure qui lui sont propres."

9
pp- 63- 64 . "C* est une scientia media ...
une science intermediaire, a cheval sur la ruathematique et
sur le science emperique de la nature, une science dont le
reel physicque fournit la matiere par les mesures qufil nous
permet d ’aller recueillir en lui, mais dont l*objet formel et
la proc4&4 de conceptualisation restent mathematiques; disons
une science materiallement physique et formellement mathefflatlqua.w This explanation 'by M. >iaritaxn is based on the
£oll&wing text from St. Thomas, In Boet de Trinit q».5. a.3 .
ad. 6 . "Quaedam vero sunt media a,"''quae p rin c ipi a mathemati ca
ad res naturales applicant, ut musica et astrologia quae tamen
magis sunt affines mathematicis, quia en earum considerations
id quod est physic!, est quasi material© quod autem raathematici quasi forraele.”
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within the physico-mathematical sciences, quantity enters
In as extension and deals with measurements in the terms
of scalar and vector quantities.

In each case the use of

quantity is determined by the specific approach to nature
employed by each intellectual discipline.
Within the realm of philosophy, quality is defined
by St. Thomas, Mas the disposition or modification of a
substance” 0^-® the qualities disposed the parts of a mobile
being so that they are in some particular figure, have a
given colour or manifest other characteristics.

Qualities

are also distinguished as those which are natural and deeply
rooted in being, and those such as shape which are surface
qualities.

The natural qualities can also be divided into

active and passive qualities.

Her© the proximate principle

of determining an operation is called active, and the proxi
mate principle of receiving activity is called passive.
quality is usually both active and passive.
is only passive.

A

Figure, however,

It is determined by the termination of the

extended mobile being in some definite manner.
Within the natural sciences, qualities or properties
are distinguishing characteristics of the material in ques
tion.

They are observable characteristics which may serve

for the identification of materials.

Under fixed external

Aquinas, In IX *‘*etaphvs. lwct. 1 (Cathala no. 17dS)
”Qualitas ex hoc quod est quaede® dispositio substantia.”
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condition®, such as properties as odour, colour, density
(weight per unit volume), freezing point and boiling point
are identifying properties*

On the other hand, those

qualities which apply only to given samples of the material
In question, such as size and weight, are not useful in
the identification and determination of this material*
they are properties confined to a particular specimen and
are not properties of the substance as auch^-.

The scien

tific concept of property bears a relationship to the
necessary accident which has a necessary connection with
the substantial essence and emanates from that essence and
bears no relationship to the contingent accident*
Sine® the natural sciences deal with the observable
and the measurable, one of the key points to which their
investigation is directed, are physical qualities or char
acteristics of the thing being investigated.

In this in

stance the philosophical definition of the concept quality,
as a modification or disposition of a thing, must underlie
the operation of observation and measurement because the
■natural sciences do not define qualities or properties
exc pt in a description.

JSach quality of a body which is

ascertained is defined in the t e w

*

of description and

L. Richardson and A. Scarlett, Op. cit*, p. 1.
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result; tho description is of the instrument used, and
the result is a mathematical determination, cade in reference
to an arbitrary scale which has been developed to show the
rang® and relationship of the property in question.
Other predicamental accidents, such as relation,
when, and where, also are individually determined within
the philosophical and the scientific spheres In accord
with the different approach of each to reality,

-sithin

philosophy these accidents arc determined as distinct and
divers® modes of being, each with its own characteristics,
which cannot exist by themselves but must inhere in an
other.
exist®.

They represent a division of being which really
Within the natural sciences, these accidents are

determined in the same way aw quality, which is in terras
of observation and. measurement, or description and. result,
this is usually accomplished in terms of functions which
act within a prearranged frame of reference.

The values

assigned to eafc'h accident are both applied and verified
by direct observations and measurements made within the
sensible order*

In some instances the values assigned

may become very remote from the real order, but the appli
cation and verification still holds, although the con
nection to reality aay be made through an elaborate in
strument .
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3. Principle
withln philosophy a principle is that from which
something else takes its rise.

In a more specific defini

tion, St. Thomas has stated that a principle ”is that from
which anything proceeds in any way whatsoever whether in
12
being, on becoming, or in knowing.”*

The first type of

principles to be considered is the principle of knowledge.
"A principle of knowledge (is) the basic idea for under
standing any body of knowledge such as the premises of a
p r o o f w » t 0 come from something* means to come out of
a material and that in two ways either out of the most in
clusive material or out of the l e a s t . T h i s
of a real principle.

is an example

In other cases a definition may be the

point of initiation and this definition itself i 3 a nominal
principle.
In philosophy an Important distinction is between
principle and cause.

It should be noted from the definition

of principle that it implies only an order of origin and

3-2 Aquihss, In ¥ Metaphys. lect. 1 (Cathala no. 761 ).
"Eeducit omnes praedietos modes ad aliquid commune; et dicit
quod in commune in omnibus dictis modis est, ut dicatur principiura illud, quod est primus aut in esse rei, sicut prima
pars rei dictur principiura, aut in fieri rei, sicut orimum
aovens dictur principium aut in rei cognition©.
^ Aristotle, metaphysics, trans. Richard Hope (hew
Tork: Columbia University Press,"” 1952), Bk. V, lect. 1 ,
;
1013a; p. B7.
\
ll* Ibid.. Bk. ¥, lect. 24, 1023a; p. 116.
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does not include any notion of influence derived from
the principle of those things which follow i «

Even the

common sense notion of cause differs from the notion of
principle| first as implying a real and positive influence

on the things of which it is the cause, whereas principle
implies no such influence; secondly, and because of this,
cause implies that the caused things are dependent on it,
but principle implies no such dependence on the part of
things which follow it; thirdly, cause implies some prior
ity to the effect, If not in time, at least in nature.
Such priority Is not implied by the notion of principle,
which signifies merely an order between things, which can
be present without any priority^.

jn effect causes are

principles, but not all principles are causes.
Within the natural sciences, the terra principle
retains part of it* philosophical meaning as an origin
from which something proceeds.

A scientific principle,

in general, does not stand as absolute and universally
accepted, but rather as relative and changing.

For the

continuous dialectic of the sciences functions in such a
Manner that a principle may b® obsolete, may be revised in

3*5 fhomas Aquinas, Be Pgincioiis Aaturae. ed. E.
Mauwelaerts (Louvain: Society of St. h&ui, 1^^), p. 91.
The distinction established between principle and cause is.
based on the following text from Thomas: MSed causa solum
dicitur de illo-prlrae ex quo consequitur esse posterioris.
^nde dictur quod causa est id ex cuius esse sequitur aluid.”
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part, or way be formulated in completely new terns.
Except in a few cases there is no formal agreement as to
what constitutes a principle*

ifhat may be denoted as a

principle by one, say be termed a theory or law by another.
In general, the most widely accepted definition of prin
ciple is a wide generalisation somewhat similar to a law.
The difference between these two types of generalisations,
law and principle, is that the ter® law is used in science,
is applied to a somewhat restricted and precise generali
sation*

The statement that, bodies attract each other in

versely as the square of their distances and directly as
their masses, is commonly referred to as a law of gravi
tation.

The concept, that the present diversity of plant

and animal life is due to a common descent from primitive
ancestors with modifications in succeeding generations,
is usually referred to as the principle of evolution.

It

should be noted that no law or principle of science is
regarded as absolutely proved*^

As a product of the

sciences, a principle is an explanation drawn from emperical observation, subject to change because of the dia
lectic natural to the sciences.

16 J.W. Mavor, A Brief Biology (Hew York: Macmil
lan, 1926), p. 5.
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In conformity with the difference between the
philosophical and scientific approach to nature, the term
principle has two applications.

The philosophical meaning

is indicative of being inasmuch at it is that frota which
something els© takes Its rise.

It Is primary and absolute.

The scientific moaning retains a meaning which is reainescent of its philosophical predecessor.

It functions in a

relative way within the dialectic of science after it has
been formulated as an explanation derived from eraperical
observation.

In this respect a theory or law say serve

as a principle or a principle may serve aa a theory or
law.

The philosopher used the tarns principle in its most

primary sense where it refers to the thing itself,

while

the scientists employ principles in a secondary way where
it deals with relationships between physical objects,
situations and events in so far as they are observable and
measurable.

4.

Causality

Within philosophy cause usually comes under the
heading of principle, but while a principle expresses prior
ity, cause signifies & priority of a particular kind.

There

is an essential connection between, the cause and that which
follows It, namely the effect.

Cause can be defined as a

principle to which something else owes its existence.
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According to St. Thomas, a "cause brings sonic influence
on th© H o be* of a thing c a u s e d . C a u s e

is further

divided into material cause and formal cause, which arc
internal; and efficient cause and final cause which are
external.

Th© material cause is that from which a thing

is made; the formal cause is that which deterr&ines the
nature of the thing*

The efficient cause is that by which

the thing is produced; the final cause is that on account
of which the thing is n ad el'*".

i'-ach of these causes is a

primary principle of a real being.
In a scientific application, the tern cause does
not have the ran :;e of its philosophical counterpart.

For

as the scientist 4ach has stated, the notion cause posses
ses importance only as a mean© of provisional knowledge or
orientation*

In any examination of an event, the scientist

must regard phenomena as dependent on one another in the
same way as the mathematician regards the sides and angles
of a triangle as dependent on one another19.

Furthermore,

1^ Aquinas, In ¥ Hetaphys. lect 1 (Cath&la nos 751,
749) "noiaen Causa importat influxam quondam ad esse causati:lam causa est ad qu&ra de necessitate sequitur."
1^ A. Dougherty, Coamolojty {hew York: Grapraoor dress,

1952), p. 13.
l ^ S m s t «aeti, The Science of Mechanics* p. 5$2.
"The notion cause poasesaes“lsigni/i cance ’"only'as a means of
provisional knowledge or orientation. In any exact or pro
found investigation of an event, the inquirer must regard
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in a wore recent statement, Hex Born concluded that
causality postulate.,* that there are laws by which the
occurrence of entity B of a certain class d,.-..rends on the
occurrence of an entity A of another class,

Causality as

a concept, is synonomous with the term, relationship where
">A
the relationship is timeless and spaceless •
In conformity with the different approaches to
reality th© philosopher uses the term cause in its aost
primary sense where It is a principle of the thing itself.
While the scientist uses the term cause in a secondary
sense where it deals with dependence or relationships be
tween physical objects, phenomena, situations and events
in so far as these relationships come within the scope of
observation and measurement.

The natural sciences in

dealing with principles anc causes are confined to the
level of the secondary proximate principles and causes of
classes of mobile being, while within philosophy the prin
ciple attention is focussed on the first principles and
causes of mobile being.

the phenomena as dependent on one another in the same way
that th© geometer regards the sides and angles of a tri
angle as dependent on one another.w
20 Max Born, Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance
(Oxford: The Clarendon Fress, 1 % 9 ) , p. 310.
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Each of these terms which has been considered serves
to emphasise the basic distinction between the approach of
the natural sciences and the philosophy of nature.

Bach

approach is primarily interested in reality and both arrive
at a valid knowledge of nature to the degree which they
penetrate it, and in harmony with the limitations imposed
by their different formal objects.

It should be noted that

within the hierarchy of knowledge both the natural sciences
and the philosophy of nature are restricted to the first
degree of abstraction,

the objects which they undertake to

investigate can ndther exist apart from matter nor be con
ceived apart from it.

The very nature of this material

object denies the possibility of ever completely penetrating
to its inner nature or essence of corporeal substances.
Though it is true that the material object of philo
sophy and science can be the same, namely ens sensibile.
the formal object which determines the specific nature of
th® intellectual disciplines, in the two instances, is
essehtlally different.

The scientist presents nature in

terms of molecules, ions and other similar constructs within
a framework of time and space.

The philosopher, on the

other hand, seeks for what, in fact, that matter is which
is so figured? what, as a function of intelligible being,
is the nature of corporeal substance.

The approach of the

philosophy of nature is a study of the intelligible aspects
of corporeal substances.

This is distinct from the adentific
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approach which is a study of the observable and measur
able aspects of corporeal substances.
The approach of the natural sciences is not com
pletely unilateral because there are divisions within th©
sciences.

Physlco-mathematics provides a pertinent example

of a scientia media or intermediary

science which is half

way between mathematics and emperical natural science.

The

physically real forms the material object in regard to the
measurement which it allows the scientist to draw from it
and the formal object and conceptual procedure remains
mathematical.

It is a science which is materially physical

since it has its end in sensible, and is formally mathe
matical.
Outside the realm of physics there are the biological
sciences which study the spheres of life and organic wholes.
Although this science resolves its concepts into sensible
and observable being, it does not undertake the construction
of a closed universe of the physico-mathematical type; and
th© fora of deductive explication which it employs is not of
the mathematical type.

Biology also employs physico-chemical

explications, which are geared to a mathematisation of the
real, but it remains primarily a science without the universal
mathematical explanatory deduction of physics.
There are two distinct and valid approaches to the
study of sensible nature.

The one, the philosophy of nature,

approaches reality or ens mobile in an effort to seek out
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its intelligible aspects, that is, it is emphasizes the
ens of ena mobile.

The other, the natural sciences, which,

are divided into the physical, the physico-mathematical,
and the biological sciences, together with their inner
sciences, approach reality or ena mobile in an effort to
discover and correlate its observable and measurable aspects,
that is, it emphasizes the mobile of ens mobile.
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THE KATUHE OP SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
The methods of science depend on basic postulates
such as the principle of causality, and the law of the
uniformity of nature.

Science uses basic concepts in a

way which is quite different fron philosophy.

In science

causality does not function in its primary Meaning as a
principle of the thing itself, rather, it is considered
in a secondary sense so that it deals with systems of
relationships within the reals* of the observable and the
measurable.

Accordingly, the physicist Max Dorn, in his

evaluation of causality, concluded that causality, as a
basic premise, postulates that there are lavra by which
the occurrence of an entity B of a certain class is de
pendent upon the occurrence of an entity A of another class.
In this instance, an entity can be any physical object,
situation, phenomenon, or event.

A as the cause must b©

prior or at least simultaneous with the effect B.

It is

also postulated that cause A and effect B must be in spatial
contact or connected by a chain of intermediate things in
contact*,

tlm principle of the. uniformity of nature as a

* Max Born, pp. eft., p. 9-

39
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primary premise of the natural sciences asserts that
under certain conditions there is a uniformity in the
activity of mobile beings.

As a principle it does not

infer that every action in nature is completely determined,
but it does state that there- is an order in nature to the
degree that it can be successfully investigated, and the
results tabulated either by statistics of functional re
lationships2 .
To obtain any given relationship the scientist
employs a specific approach,

hhere necessary, the appar

atus is assembled to reproduce a desired set of conditions
and to measure the occurrences in a closed system.

In

those branches of the natural sciences where this is not
possible, the initial part of the procedure is trained ob
servation.

In order to be successful, the observer must

obtain a composite picture of the object under investigation;
he must have an extensive knowledge of the previous research
accomplished in this particular field.

Only then can he be

prepared to discover relationships between phenomena appar
ently quite remote from, each other^.

These requirements

2 For a further discussion of th© principle of the
uniformity of nature vide Dougherty, op. elt.. pp. 162-166.
3 F.M. Vestaway, Scientific Method (hew York: Hillman-Curl Inc., 1937)* P. I967~....
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for trained observation also apply when direct observation
is replaced by experimentation*
Wherever possible, experimentation is employed.
The object of an experiment is to set up a controlled
system where only one circumstance is allowed to vary at
a time.

The experimenter, if possible, also seeks to eli

minate non-essential conditions of the phenomenon under
investigation.

If more than one circumstance is varied

at th© same time, it is impossible to determine which con
dition creates the effect, or when .no effect ensues, if
any of the participating circumstances is completely in
different^.

Therefore, in the first part of the scien

tific procedure the investigator aims at the determination
of certain relationships either through observation alone
or experimentation.

These relationships, if they are

verified by a number of repeated experiments or obser
vations of the same nature, provide the material for the
next step, which is the interpretation of these relation
ships. They for® the basis for a type of reasoning known
as scientific induction.

4 IMi*
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Scientific induction is but one division of in
duction.

In ita widest extension, as P. Goffey has

pointed out, it also includes the attainment of necessary
self-evident principles through abstraction, intuition,
and generalisation.

Therefore, induction is any process

of reasoning which moves from the plane of the concrete
singular to the plane of ideas, the plane of the univer
sal^.

When parts in question are the singular data of

sense experience, as they usually are within the natural
sciences, it is impossible to enumerate them completely
since the human mind cannot pass in review all of indivi
dual cases.

Therefore, induction, as employed within the

natural sciences, is incomplete induction, induction by
incomplete enumeration.
W.R. Thompson in his book, Science and Common Sense,
has provided an illustration of the function and character
istics of scientific induction by applying it to a classi-

> P. Goffey, The Science of ^ogic (London; ^ongmans
Green and Co., 1912), 11,''25. low this simple process
of abstraction. Intuition., and generalisation by which we
a t tainto a k n o w l e d g e o f s e l f necessary principles, through
the notions which we abstract from sense experience, is
sometimes called Induction. But this is using the word in
such a wide sense as to make it embrace every mental process
bv which we ascend from or through the particular to the
u
n
i
v
e
r
s
a
l
.
'
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fication of the house-fly.

Repeated observations disclosed

that the House-fly possesses two wings and only two wings
as a constant attribute, therefore, the House-fly belongs
to a two-winged species.

It also has a complex collection

of anatomical features which characterise it as a member
of the family of Muscid flies,

further observations of

flies of this type reveals that, although they differ some
what, they all have two wings*

In general it can be con

cluded that Muscid have two wings, or that the &uscid is
ft
a two-winged type0 .

Furthermore, Thompson ihdicated that

this example is an ascending induction, the movement from
the particular to the general, and that it is possible to
reverse the process in a descending induction, the movement
from the general to th© particular*
given for & descending induction.
winged.

This is the example
"The Muscid is a two

Wow the Blow-fly, the Green-bottle, and the House

fly are all Muscids.

Therefore, th© Green-bottle is a two

winged insect.
In the same discussion, Thompson also reached cer
tain conclusions about the characteristics of the inductive

6 The example cited is based upon .tt. Thompson,
Science and Common Sense (London; hongmans Green and Co.,
193*?), pp. 30-31.
‘
7 Ibid*, p. 32*
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process as an instrument within the natural sciences.

It

is an ascension .front particular cases to the concept of a
nature common to them, which expresses itself in every in
dividual*

accordingly, the truth attained does not pertain

merely to a collection of individuals but has a general value.
As an argument or proof, the inductive conclusion, in roost
instances, cannot load to complete certainty, since it de
pends on an insufficient enumeration of cases.

Although

the inductive process gains a knowledge about the nature of
things, it does not gain absolute certainty because there
is no guarantee that the constancy of the properties obsers#
ved is an essential feature of material things . Inductive
science, though often unconscious of its limitations, can
only roach conclusions which are more or less probable. On
occasion, the probability In favour of a generalisation is

Ibid., pp. 31*32. ''In the inductive process we
thus pass ?rosa the enumeration of particular cases to the
idea of the nature common to them which will express itself
in every individual; so that the truth reached applies not
merely to the collection of individuals but has a general
value. On the other hand, the value of the inductive con
clusion d©p#nc!s on a sufficient enumeration of cases and thus,
considered as an a r g i m e nT^r ^ r o i o F T ^ a n n o t T o r d l n ^ T l y at
least^ lead to complete certainty .........................
ihus, while the inductive process gives us definitely
more than knowledge of a mere collectivity and really tells
us something about the nature of a thing, it does not enable
us to attain absolute certainty. We cannot always be sure
that the constancy of properties we observe in tho material
which we can examine is an essential feature, and this is
because the inductive process "does not really lay the nature
of things open to us, or enable us to discern their inherent
necessities*.”
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enormous, but absolute certainty is never reached.
The facts obtained through observation and experi
mentation, although of fundamental import, do not constitute
a science until they have been classified and correlated through
scientific induction.

The function of a scientist rests up >n

the interpretation of results in order to discover a law.
Within the natural sciences a law is sometimes defined as,
"A common mode of action of material things”.9

The laws

which are formulated have as their test the capability of
experimental verification within the limits of calculated
error.

If a law Is verified within the limits of experi

mental error, it is an exact law; and if the -deviation is
somewhat greater than that inherent in the experiment, it is
an approximate law.
The element of probability which is a characteristic
of scientific induction also manifests Itself in the scien
tific law.

Scientific laws are such are not statements of

absolute certitude, nor are they totally contigent.

The

reason for the element of stability in a scientific law is,
as M. M&ritain has indicated, the fact that it does nothing
but explain or express in a more or less direct,or more or
less distorted manner the properties or exigencies of a
certain ontological indivisible.

This ontological indivisi

ble which is not within the observable remains an x an

9 Richardson and Scarlett, op. cit.. p. 10.
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indispensable x for the natural sciences.

This x is none

other than what philosophy designates by the same essence.

10
or n a t u r e .

Although scientific laws seek to express the

essences and natures of things, it must be clearly under
stood, as M. Maritain has pointed out, that the natural
sciences do not penetrate to these essences in their in
telligible constitution.

Even the question of knowing

whether the provisional and unstable categories which the
scientists construct, and upon which they toil, correspond
exactly to these essences, reamins in doubt,

nevertheless,

the raison d*etre for the necessity of the stable relations
among the elements chosen by the scientists from phenomena,
formulated by the scientists, and upon which they build,
resides exactly in these presupposed ontological non-observables.

The necessity of these laws is founded on the fact

that they are concerned with the observable manifestations
of the essences or natures, and that these.essences or natures
are the foundation of intelligible necessities^.

10

/

Maritain, Les hearss Du Savoir. p. 50. BReraarquons que la loi scientique ne fait jamais q«*exprimer (de
faco,n jplus on groins direct© ou plus raoins detournee) la propriete .ou 1*exigence d*un certain indivisible ontologique
qui par lui-a^ke ne tomb© sous les sens {nfest pas observable)
et rest© pour les science de la nature un x (d’ailleurs in
dispensable), et qui n*est autre qu© ce que les philosophes
designent sous le non de nature our essence.”
^ Ibid*, p. 51* wLes sciences experimentales ne
penetrant pas ces essences dans leur constitution intelli
gible et morse la question de savoir si les categories plus
ou moins provisiores et instables qu*ellas construisent et
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A scientific law is a statement of the relation
ship discovered among certain phenomena through observation
and experimentation.

As a law it can reach a hlgn degree

of probability but never absolute certitude, since it is
based on incomplete induction.

The possibility always exists

that the investigator may discover an exception which would
require a modification of the law.

This poses one of the

major limits of a scientific law, and the material sciences.
The stability and power of a scientific law lies in the
fact that it is concerned with the observable manifestations
of essences of things.

In this respect the necessity of a

scientific law is founded on the fact that it seeks to ex
press and describe, however poorly, the properties of the
natures of things as they manifest themselves within the
realm of the observable and measurable.

Therefore, a scien

tific law Is a composite of the necessary and the contingent,
where the contingent must always be prepared to submit to
modifications introduced by new discoveries gained through
the dialectic of science.

In the course of this dialectic,

the necessary factors of an old law, if its basic premises

sur lesquelles elles operentlour travail rationnel leur
correspondent exaetement, reate le plus souvent douteuse.
G*est bien cependant dans ces non-observables ontologiernes
oresupposes que reside la raison d'^^tre de’Tfa" neceasite des
relations stable formulees par le science entre les elements
que 1*esprit choisit dans les phenoneues, ou qu* il construit
sur leur fondemont. La necessity des lois vient de ce que
celles-ci coneerant proprement et en fin de compte les essen
ces ou natures, et de ce que les essences ou natures sont le
lieu des necessites intelligibles."
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are correct, always find a place in the new law which
supersede© it*
The natural sciences are never content with the
knowledge of facts and laws alone*

They seek a further

explanation which is a hypothesis, a definitely reasoned
explanation of the facts and laws which have been accumu
lated by scientific research*

The characteristics of a

scientific hypothesis are such, as Coffey has indicated,
that it must be based on accurate and unbiased observation
of facts; it must be constructed in order to explain them;
and therefore, must have for its object a real cause.

It

must be self-consistent and must be free from conflict
with established truths and laws since truth cannot oppose
truth*

In this instance, caution is needed to assure a

real conflict which cannot be eliminated by any -possible
restatement of a proposed, hypothesis*

The hypothesis

must be based on some analogy with known causes; be capable
of exact deductive inference; and must be verifiable by
the submission of these inferences to the control of ob
servation and experimentation*

Wien a hypothesis presents

not only a sufficient explanation, but the only possible
explanation of the facts it purports to account for, it is
verified or established^.

Coffeyt os. cit*« II, 121,
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The conditions n cessary for the proper develop
ment of a scientific hypothesis also apply to a scientific
theory, inasmuch as a scientific theory is usually defined
as Ma hypothesis which has been applied to an extensive
series of related facts and has been found satisfactory in
its explanation of those

facts

the complete understanding of

It is important to
the nature of a scientific

theory to comprehend, as E.f. Caldin has indicated, that a
scientific theory, as a working hypothesis, is not a strict
deduction, but a construction based on empirical laws.
A scientific theory is not deducible by
. formal logic fro® the empirical laws that
support It. The argument is not of the
deductlbely correct type, *j» implies £*
(in other words, %2
deducible from p ) ,
but jg 1* likely on the evidence, there
fore, £ is likely - where £ stands for an
empirical law or set of laws, and £ for
a unifying theory. It is rather a sort
of inverted for® of this argument: tt£
(a unifying theory) implies p.r.s: but
, and s are empirical generalisations
t are likely on the evidence; therefore,
is likely. The conclusion does not
ollow from the premise; the likelihood
of the theory is therefore not a dedu
ction fro® the empirical laws that are
taken to support it. Mow then is a
theory validT The answer is parallel
to that which we give for empirical
generalisation. Scientific theories

M
§

^

iiichardson and Scarlett, o p

.clt..

p. 11.
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are not deductions but interpretations
(a® indeed %hey are eoauoniy called in
science} ; these interpretations dales
validity in as much as we are justified
In regarding empirical laws as signs
pointing to'the unified scheme or
picture' presented by a theory, the
justification of the belief that em
pirical laws are signs of a more fund
amental order requires at least the
assumption that there is order in

nature.1^
Therefore, a scientific theory, together with the other
generalizations of the natural sciences, relies for its
justification on the primary postulate that there is uni
formity in nature.
Within the framework of the natural sciences it
might appear that certain theories, such as the complex
theories of physico-mathematics, are completely divorced
from reality,

however, this is not the case*

As M. Marl-

tain has carefully pointed out, physics is based on the
ontologicclly real and is preoccupied with causes; but in
the instance of physico-mathenatics, it only envisages these
physical causes from the angle of mathematics.

It retains

the real only in its measurable bearing _as recorded by in
struments; and it is through these measurements which are
real, that the entities of this science have a foundation

3*4 l.F. Caldin, The Power and limits of Science.
”A Philosophical Study** r K n d o n l:',ir’
(ihapSan" and' "Hall "ltd.",'

1949)» P- 69.
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In reality; but it is in the measurable that mathematical
physics resolves all its concepts, which alone have meaning
for it.

Once attained, these measurements are joined by

mathematical relationships, deductive in for®, which need
to be completed by a certain hypothetical construction of
the physically real, wherein it is only asked that their
ultimate numerical results should coincide with the measure
ments of things gained by the instruments utilized^5.

in

this way mathematical theories co-ordinate the physical laws
discovered by experimentation through the utilization of
mathematics.
Just as in all science, mathematical physics and its
theories seek the truth, but in the followihg sense.

As M.

Maritain has indicated, a physico-mathematical theory is
considered "true" when the comprehensive and correlated
system, and the arrangement of mathematical symbols and

^ Mar it ain, its Deeres Du Savoir. p.p.121-122. nLa
physique 8*&pplui© sur la realitd' ontologique, ©lie ost preoccupee des causes... Mals cette realit! ontologique, ces
causes physiques, ©lie les^envisage exclusiveiaent sous 1*
angle wathematique... Bu reel, ©lie n© retient que son com
port ement mesurable, les mesures prises sur lui par nos in
struments, - et ces mesures, c*est bien q elque chose de r6ifel
c*est rSce av ©lies que les entites et les symbols de la
physico-mathcEiatique sont fondls dans la rSalite. Mais c’est
dans le mesurable qu’elle rlsout toua sea concepts, le
mesurabl© ®eul a un sens pour @11®. Et une fois en posses
sion de aes mesures, ©11© vis© essentiellement s' tisser entr©
elles un reseau de relations ajathematiques a forme deductive*
Qui sans doute, devron^, so completer par une certain® recon
struction hy tothetique du riel physique, mais aux-quelles il
est seuifeeraent demand! que leurs ultimes resultats nuaeriques
avec las assures effectuees sur le choses par nos instruments
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explicative entities which it can organizet coincides in
all its numerical conclusions with real measurements effected
by an investigator.

It is not in the least necessary that

each of the symbols and the mathematical beingis in question
should precisely correspond with any physical reality, a
certain nature or ontological law in the world of bodies^.
With certain modifications, the requirements for a physicomatheaatical theory to be true, applies to all scientific
theories.
Thus, a scientific theory is a definitely reasoned
explanation of facts accumulated by investigation which has
been applied to an extensive series of facts which are re
lated and has been found satisfactory in its explanation of
those facts.

It is not deducible by formal logic fro® the

empirical laws that underlie it; rather, it is an Interpre
tation of the empirical laws which support it.

A scientific

theory is developed by a standard procedure and its validity
is tested by experiments deduced from it.

As a theory it

can reach a high degree of pro ability but never absolute

^ Ibid., pp. 122-123 . ”Une theorie phys ico-matheraat ique
sera dlte wvraTe” quand le system© coherent et le plus ample
possible de symbol©s aathematiques et d'entites explieatives
qu'elle aura organise" coincidera par to;.tor. ses conclusions
numeriques avec les assures reelement effectuees ar nous,
sans qu*il soit nuilement necessaire qu’une realite" physique,
un© certain© nature on lol pntologlque dans le mond© des
corps, correspond dateraineraent as chacun des symbol©s et, des
Stres matheraatiquas en question."
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certitude since it is founded on empirical laws which them
selves are based on incomplete Induction.

The possibility e

exists that further research may discover an exception which
would require modification of the theory.

This poses one of

the major limitations of a scientific theory and consequently
scientific knowledge.

The stability and power of scientific

theory is founded on the fact that it seeks to express and
describe, however poorly and remotely, the properties of the
nature of things as they manifest themselves within the
realm of the observable and the measurable.

Therefore,a

scientific theory is a composite of the necessary and the
contingent, where the contingent must be prepared to be sub
mitted to the dialectic of science.

In the course of this

dialectic, the necessary factors of the old theory, if its
basic premises are correct, always find a place in the new
theory which supersedes it.
In the terns of a brief illustration, the earlier
stages of the atomic theory provide an excellent example of
the type of knowledge discovered by the application of the
scientific method to the problem of change within the realm
of the observable and the measurable.

'As Dr. lonant has

pointed-out, the idea that matter was composed of fundamental
uni s, or ultimate particles goes back to the dawn of western
thought.

If expressed merely in general terms, the concept

of fundamental units, as a speculative idea, can hardly be
regarded as an integral part of the natural sciences until
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it forms the basis of a working hypothesis frow. which de
ductions capable of experimental verification can oe made.
As a working hypothesis, the atomic theory became a new
conceptual scheme only after Dalton had demonstrated how
fruitful it was in connection with the quantitative chemical
experimentation that had been developed, by the chemical re
volution^.
In this instance, the rebirth of the atomic theory
was ho accident because certain experiments by Lavoiser and
others cast grave doubts on the current theory of that time,
the phlogiston theory.

Historically, George Ernest Stahl

(1660-1734) was the chief advocate of the phlogiston theory.

A theory which considered that all metals were made up of
calces - our raet&l oxides - and phlogiston, a combustible
material.

In the process of the combustion of metals it was

assumed that phlogiston was expelled and that the calx re
mained.

The smaller the residue of calx after combustion,

U James B. Conant, Science and Common Sense (Hew
York: Yale University Press,,r"I^3T)"»" p# 4$.
notion that
there were fundamental units - ultimate particles - of which
matter was composed goes back to ancient times. But expres
sed merely in general terras this is a speculative idea and
can hardly be considered an integral part of ‘die fabric of
science until It becomes the basis of a working hypothesis
on a grand scale .from which deductions capable of experimental
test can be made. This particular speculative idea or work
ing hypothesis on a grand scale, became a new conceptual
scheme only after Dalton had shown about 1$0G how fruitful
it was in connection with the quantitative chemical experi
mentation that had been initiated by the chemical revolution.”
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the more phlogiston it contained.

Consequently, in the

light of this theory, carbon was considered as consisting
entirely of phlogiston.

If carbon was added to a metal

calx, the calx would absorb phlogiston and become a metal
again

1#

.

The object of this theory was the system!sation

of the phenomena of oxidation and reduction which is so
important in chemistry.
The basic premise upon which the phlogiston theory
was constructed was the postulate that metals lose weight
through combustion.

Therefore with the enunciation and

the experimental verification of the law of constant compo
sition which stated that every chemical compound contains
unvarying proportions of its constituent.3 , and of the law
of the conservation of mass which stated that in every
chemical change the total mass of the reactants is exactly
equal to the total mass of the products, the weakness of
the phlogiston theory became apparent.

More specifically,

it was discovered that a metal gains weight in combustion
and, therefore, the phlogiston theory was discarded because
its basic premise had been dlsnroven.
Subsequent to these developments, and after con
siderable experimental research, John Dalton developed the

Andrew 0. Van Meiaen, From Atoaos to Atoms. ’’The
History of the Concept Atom1*, transT he' -ry T.'r Korn ''IP'ittsburgs Duquesne University Press, 1952), p. 132.
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law of nultlple proportions*

This law stated that when

any two elements A and B combine to fora more than on©
compound, the weights of A that will combine with 1 g. of
B are in the ratio of small whole numbers.

For Dalton this

justified a notion which he h-;.s always considered, and
allowed him to elaborate his atomic theory.

The basic

premises of his thought becomes evident from these sections
of his atomic theory.
There are three distinctions in the kinds
of bodies, or three states which have more
especially claimed the attention of philo
sophical chemists, namely, those which are
marked by the terms elastic fluids, liquids,
and solids* A very fSSi'Xiar" instance is
exhiSIte<r*‘
to us in water, of a. body, which,
in certain circumstances is capable of
assuming all three states. In steam we
recognise a perfectly elastic fluid, in
water, a perfect liquid, and in ice a
perfect solid* These observations have
tabitly led to the conclusion which seems
universally adopted, that all bodies of
sensible magnitude, whether liquid or
solid, are constituted of a tpst number of
extremely small particles or atoms of
matter bound together by a force of
attraction which is more or less power
ful, according to the circumstances, and
which as it endeavours to prevent their
separation is very properly called in that
view, attraction of cohesion; but as it
Golleoii’TliST”^^^
state (as
fro® steam into water) it is called attra
ction^ of aggregation or more simply affiit*y* ^

2-9 John Dalton, A hew System of Chemical Philosophy
(London; 1&42), p. 141*
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,

Dalton’s outstanding achievement was the interpre

tation of the new chemical data and the new chemical laws
through his atonic theory.

He gave new impetus to the idea

that change must be explained by means of small particles.
His atoms did not have vague specifications but were endowed
with those properties which the progress of chemistry de
manded.

In the light of this theory, the experimental

sciences have progressed to determine other specific pro
perties of the atom which has enabled them to enlarge upon
and modify Dalton’s atomic'theory.
This brief outline of the development of Dalton1a
atomic theory serves to illustrate that the progress of the
!

experimental sciences is bound up in a strict adherence to
their principles.

The first is the empirical principle

which refers to the method of experimental sciences,

it

requires a strict adherence to the accepted methods and re
quires their proper application.

The phlogiston theory

serves as real example of the consequences when the basic
premises which underlie & theory are faulty.

This principle

also serves to limit scientific knowledge to the type gained
through observation and experimentation; but in defining
scientific knowledge as that gained arid verified by the ex
perimental method, it forms no conclusions about other
methods employed by other intellectual disciplines.
The second basis for scientific knowledge is the
quantitative principle which necessarily follows, from the
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first.

The quantitative principle is a limiting principle

which states that as long as science is true to its method,
It must confine its studies to the observable and measur
able aspects of reality, and, therefore, the knowledge
gained is restricted to the observable and measurable
within the real® of reality.

The atomic theory, for ex

ample, illustrate® that the scientific method begins and
end© with the observable and measurable, the knowledge
gained, therefore, ia otily concerned with the observable
and measurable of reality.

Again the quantitative principle

does not speculate about the possibility of other aspects
of reality which might bo known in different ways since
they fall outside the scope of scientific investigation.
The third principle, the mechanical urine 1ole.. is
concerned with the goal of every scientific inquiry,

Science

alas at gaining, a knowledge of the general laws that govern
the behaviour of events within the observable and measur
able of reality.

It is necessary to the stability of scien

tific knowledge that the laws which It enunciates happen
in regular, repeated and invariable sequences.

The atomic

theory, in this instance, would be of no consequence were
it not based on laws which reflected the uniformity of
nature and causality.

Therefore, the mechanical principle

Is a H a t t i n g principle which recognises that scientific
knowledge, because it is concerned with laws, is
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restricted to the assimilation of that kind of behaviour
which, consists of natural cause artel effect series.

Again,

just as its counterparts, the mechanical principle only
acts within the lines of strict scientific investigation
and does not reflect on any other acts such as chance which
occur outside its sphere of application.
The fourth fundamental principle of science is the
progressive principle, which deals with the natural dialectic
of the experimental sciences.

This principle affirms that

scientific knowledge is constantly being revised,

Avery

scientific theory is liable to constant Modifications and
revisions in the light of future experience.

If any part

of scientific knowledge is in error, it is rejected just
as the phlogiston theory was rejected when it was found in
error.

Moreover, the knowledge of science is not only always

expanding, but is normally available to all Investigators
so that every scientist stands on the shoulder of his pre
decessor.

Again, this progressive principle contains no im

plications about progress on other levels of life; and in
itself is no guarantee of human progress^.
These four principles present the characteristics
and limitations of the natural sciences, and of scientific

The development of these four principles of the
natural sciences is patterned after a similar development in
B.R.G. Owens, Scientism. Man and Religion {Philadelphia: The
Westminister Press, "1952)","'p
p
20•
;
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knowledge.

Experimentation and the other steps of this

procedure form the basic pattern for every scientific ad
vance.

this pattern is a constant in every scientific in

vestigation, new or old; in one respect it forms the history
of scientific knowledge because the unfolding of this method
coupled with the ingenuity, the intuition, and the fallibi
lity of tha scientist marks the progress of the experimental
sciences.

The whole of scientific knowledge is constructed

through its theories and laws upon the experimental, and so
it also suffers from the Incomplete enumeration of scientific
induction.

Therefore, scientific knowledge may reach a high

degree of probability but never absolute certitude.

The

possibility always exists that new discoveries will require
modifications within its structure.

This poses one of the

major limitations of scientific knowledge, and distinguishes
it from the knowledge gained by other intellectual disciplines.
The stability and power of scientific knowledge is founded
on the fact that it seeks to express the properties of the
natures of t hings as they manifest themselves within the
realm of the observable and measurable of reality.

Scien

tific knowledge is a composite of the necessary and the con
tingent where the contingent must always be prepared to be
submitted to the natural dialectic of the sciences.

In the

course of this dialectic, the necessary factors of scientific
knowledge, if their basic premises are correct, always find
a place in the new knowledge which modifies or supersedes it.

ASSUPTP1IVTOY
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IV
ON THE NATURE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
Philosophy, since it is a study of reality, has in
the course of the development of Western thought, sought
the solution of many of the problems of sensible nature
which have confronted it.

Accordingly, the study of the

problems of ens mobile has been prominent both in philo
sophy and in the sciences of phenomena.

It is a fact of

historical record that the many problems, which arose from
the investigation of sensible reality, presented such a
provoking challenge to thoughtful men, that the whole effort
of the early Greek philosophers, such as Thales, heracleitus,
and Anaxagoras, was directed toward their solution.

The

Investigations of these philosophers, their contemporaries,
and their successors culminated in the major contributions
of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas.
With the decline of philosophical progress, and the
discovery and immediate success of the experimental method,
a new era was born.

Philosophy, forgetful of its great

heritage, also sought to continue its progress by adopting
both hhe new experimental method, and the conclusions which
the experimental sciences had discovered and formulated.
The experimental method became for many the philosophical
instrument for research and the scientific theories, its
basic premises.

Therefore, as a consequence, it would seem
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that these philosophical systems which have scientific
theories as their basic premises would face annihilation
as complete systems as soon as the theories upon which they
stand are superseded in the natural dialectic of scientific
progress*

In contrast to these systems, Thomism does hot

pretend to imitate the experimental method or to adopt any
particular scientific theory as its foundatiort.

In direct

reference to the question of ens mobile, it cannot be over
emphasized that the principles and conclusions expressed
by thomism, through its philosophy of nature, are not the
products of scientific experimentation.
Instead, thomism tries to reach beyond phenomena,
in order to grasp what the mind perceives to be most inward
and fundamental in things*

As

B r i t a i n has pointed out,

the inmost core of things which philosophy seeks to discover
is being, the being in sensible things which is first
object attained by the intellect.

And what is being?

Being is what exists or can exist; it first and immediately
presents to the intellect that it exists, or can exist out
side the mind*

It is sufficient to experience the absolute

impossibility of the Intellect’s thinking of the principle
of identity; what is, is, without positing (at least possible)
extramental being, of which the principle of identity is
the first of all axioms.

Ihis apprehension of being is ab

solutely primary and is implied in all other intellectual
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apprehensions*-.
6ince philosophy has its foundation in being,
rather than in the observable and measurable aspects of
sensible phenomena, it is essentially distinct from the
natural sciences.

This difference is also reflected in the

methods peculiar to each intellectual discipline.

Just as

the scientific method is directed to the discovery of the
relationships among phenomena, so the philosophical approach
is geared to the discovery and development of the laws and
principles of being.

The point of initiation for the

philosophical method is being, as found in extramenta!
reality.

It is the real made known by the senses, and

attained by physical contact with the universe.

Philo

sophy rests upon facts which are well founded existential
truths.

These facts are not created by the human mind, but

are given to the mind which discerns and judges them.

Philo

sophy in its search for truth begins with experience.
Although philosophy begins with experience, it does

Maritain, Les Degree Du Savoir, pp. 1#3~1$4. WL ’«
etre, en effet (1 *etre eriveYoppd1 dans les choses sensibles)
efct le premier object atteint par notre intelligence, Et
qu’est-ce qui est signifi^ par ce no® d ’etre sinon ce qui
existe ou peut exister; et qu’est-c© qui est d *abord et imraeiliatement presente' 'par la a 1*intelligence sinon ce qui existe
o? peut exister pour s*4... II suffit a chaucun de se con
sul ter soi meme et d*experimenter en sol l ’impossibilite
absolue ou^ se trouve 1*intelligence de penser le principe
d ’ldentite’sans poser de l ’etre extramental (au moins pos
sible) dont ce premier de tous les axioms exprime le comportement. •* Cette apprehension de l ’etre est absolument
premiere et elle est impliquee dans toue nos autres appre
hensions intellectuelles.”
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not at® at a knowledge of the particular, but seeks to
discover the necessary and universal principles witch are
contained in the inner core of reality.

Therefor®, the

first major part of the philosophical method is the move
ment from the plan© of the particular to the plan© of the
universal, and the formation of universal concepts.
hia description of this initial step,

In

Coffey has in

dicated that it is from sense observations of a few in
stances that these concepts are formed,

These observations

are n@cessa.ry in order to get, for example, the notions of
"whole* and "part*' and 11greater”.

Once these intellectual

notions have been abstracted from sense experience and have
been compared with one another, there is an immediate in
tellectual intuition of the necessary truth that "the whole
is greater than its parts.

It will be seen that this truth

does apply to every whole, be it actual or possible, known
or unknown,

This truth is assented to, not because all tho

instances have been -examined, but because the relation is
perceived to universal because it is necessary.

This pro

cess of abstraction, intuition, and generalisation, by
which a knowledge of self-evident necessary principles is
attained through the notions which are abstracted from
sense experience, is sometimes called induction. Here the
term, is used in its widest sens© to denote every mental
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process by which there it# an ascension from or through
the particular to the universal2*
Thus, once the iiiteUo t grasps tee notion of
being, it perceives certain fandammUtL pr triein,lea through
abstraction, intuition, mid general!author,

these prin

ciples are the principle of identity which stater; what
Is, is; and the principle of non-co ntrad it ion which states;
what is, cannot not be at the same tiisse and in the stisse re
lation#

There necessary and universal principles are the

point of initiation for the next aajor part of the philo
sophical method which is the syllogism*
The syllogism is distinguished froa other types
©£ argumentation according to the manner in which it mani
fests the truth.

M* narlt&in has indicated that in a

syllogism the taind begins with the- first universal prin
ciples known tm-.edlately by the intelligence and joins these
principles to & conclusion, or conversely, the mind can
resolve a conclusioa Into these principles,

here the mind

®ove® Purcly OB **» infculligibli' plane, and develops the
truth of the propositions, in so far-as It Is contained

2 0©ffey, fi&aJ&fc** 11 * 2^*
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in the universal truth from which it has been drawn.

In

the terms of M. Maritain1s example, the preceding is illus
trated! "Everything that subsists immaterially is indes
tructible, but tho human soul subsists immaterially; there

fore the human soul is indestructible."
This is an example of a deductive argument or
syllogism in which the S (human soul) and the Pr (indes
tructible) of tho conclusion are united to each other by
their common union to the middle term (that subsists imma
terially) .3
More specifically, M. Maritain has defined a syllo
gism as, "an argumentation in which, from an antecedent that
unites two terms to a third, a consequent is inferred uniting

3 Maritain, "L’Ordre Das Concepts", Clements De
Philosophic. II, 196. "hotre aspir.it se raeut a partir des
premiers' arinciues universal^ connua iranediatcment par
1* intelligence. on reliant a ces principea une conclusion
ou en la *resolvantf en eux: il se r.teut alors purement sur
le plan intelligible, et il manifesto la verite d ’une pro
position en tani qu’elle est continue dans une verite universelle dont ell© derive.
Example: Tout ce qui subsist© imrrtateriallement est indest
ructible; or l ’ame hunaine subsist© immateriellement done
I 1am® humaine est indestructible.
C ,est 1*argumentation deductive ou le syllogism©
dans lequel le''"!'"!1 *am©"humaine) 'e t '"le" Pr (indestructible)
de la Conclusion sont unis entre eux de par leur union a
troisieme term© appele raoyen terse ("qui subsist© immaterielleraent” ).
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these two terras to each o t h e r . T h e two terms, as M.
Maritain has indicated, that are united as 3 and Br in the
conclusion are called extremes.

Since the Pr normally has

a greater extension than the 3, the Fr of the conclusion is
called the Major Extreme or the Major Term (T), aad the 3
of the conclusion, the Minor Extreme or the Minor Term (t)•
The term to which etch of these two terms T and t is united
in the antecedent, and which is the means or reason of their
union in the conclusion, is called the Middle Tern (M)•
These three terms, T, t, and M, are remote matter of the
syllogism*

The two propositions composing the antecedent,

each of which unites one of the extremes to the Middle Term,
are called the Premises of the syllogism.

The premise con

taining the Major Term {the term that becomes the- Pr of the
conclusion) is called the Major.

The premise containing the

Minor term (the ter® that becomes the S of the conclusion)
is called the Minor.

The Major, Minor, and Conclusion con

stitute the proximate matter of the syllogism?.

^ Ibid. , p. 207* ”1?n® argumentation dans laauelle
d fun antecedent oul unit deux'tarawa a un trois&ae. au infere un consequent aui unit ces deug t o m e s entr® eux.”
^ Ibid.. p. 20$. M0n appelle qxtrcki&s les deux termas
qui sont unis a titre de 3 et d® i*r clans la Conclusion. St
comas® 1® Pr a noraalement une extension plus grande que le 3,
on est convenu d fappeler fke Pr de la Conclusion Grande Extr^ae
ou Grand® Term® (?) et d*appeler le 3 de la Conclusion Petit
SxfFrem® ou Petit Term® (t). Le Terffie^auquel chacun d o .ces
deux teraes T et est uni dans 1*antecedent, et qui est aovan
o u m i s o n da leur union dans la Conclusion est appele Moyen
Term® (M). Ces trois terraes T, t et M, sont la saatiefr® eldr
.......... . \.
gnee du Syllogism . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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The syllogism, as a mode of reasoning, not only has
its point of initiation with the principles of identity and
non-contradiction, but also depends on these same principles
for its strength and validity.

For as M, Maritain has pointed

out, the total force of the syllogism and the deductive art
hinges upon this supreme self-evident principle which is:
two things, identical with the same third thing are iden
tical with each other; or, two things, one of which is iden
tical, the other not identical with a same third thing, are
different from each other.

This principle, as the principle

of triple identity in its positive form, and the principle
of the separating third in its negative form, is but a par
ticular expression of the principle of identity, or of the
principle of contradiction.

But the first principle of

syllogism may be applied to those reasonings which have for
their matter abstract and universal concepts only through
two other equally basic principles, which deal with the
relation of the universal concept with its subjective parts.
Accordingly, this principle states: that which is universally
affirmed of a subject, is affirmed of everything contained
under that subject; or that which is universally denied of

lies deux Propositions^qui composent 1*antecedent, et doht
chacune unit l*un des extremes au i^oyen Teiane sont appelies
les Premisses du Syllogisms. Celle qui contiont le Grande
Terme *c'est-a-dire le term© qui sera le Pr de la Conclusion)!
est appele Majeure. Celle qui contient le Petit Terme {c*est
a dire la term® qui sera le S de la Conclusion) est appele
Mineure. Majeurfc, Mineure et Conclusion constitutent le
matter© prochains de Syllogism.”
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a subject, is denied of everything contained under that
subject.

These principles are self-evident since it is the

nature of the universal to be one and the same in all those
things in respect of which it is universal^.

The syllogism,

as a process of reasoning, is governed by certain definite
limits which, if adhered to, allow the development and dis
covery of certain universal truths,

Thses truths are derived

from necessary principles gained from experience through ab
straction, intuition, and generalization, and are as certain
as the principles upon which they rest.

Herein lies one of

the major reasons for the power and range of philosophy.

Ibid.. pp. 215-217. "Toute la vertu du Syllogisms
et de 1*..
.. .
- ...____ ________
__ ______ ,;._r
lui-meme:
Deux chose identiques a une meiae troisieme sont identifues
eotre" elTes;....... .."""
"
......"""""" "
""
1"■
et deux choses dont l*une eat identique
et I 1autre non identique a* une metne troisieme sont diverses
eritre" eTles*
&e" principe qu’on pourrait appeler wprincipe de la triple identitl” dans sa forme positive, et "principe du tiers separ^nt”
dans sa forme negative, n*est qu*une expression particuliere
du principe d ’identite, ... ou de contradiction . . . . . . .
Mais le principe du Syllogism® ne peut s ’appliquer it nos raisonr.emenbs - qui ont pour matiere des concepts, abstraits et universels, - que mpyennant deux autres orincioes egalement supremes,
qui concernent la rapport du concept universal, avec ses parties
subjective® et qu’on ne saurait meconnattre sans d&truire le
Syllogism®.
^
Tout ce qui est a ffirme d*un sujet untversellement est
affirm^ de tout c V qu'f' 'est'coirt'emT'sro^^
ces
q u i "e st'"uni'ver selXement 1t&3T <31 '*un sujet ."est" ni«T'aus si d e tout
ce"" qui est eintenu sous' 'ce sujet. .. Ges d e ^ ' p H h c i p e s sont
connus de soi ou"'evidents”par Vux-mSmes, puisque la nature de
l*universel consist© precismnent ©n ce qu’il se trouve un et
le mem© en toutes les choses & l ’egard desquelles il est uni
verse!. w
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Within the structure of philosophy, there are cer
tain definite divisions which lend order to this science,
and exercise certain limitations on each of its parts.
This division is the three degrees of abstraction, which
correspond to the degree of immateriality of the object
under study, and permit the classification of the generic
types of knowledge.

Within the first degree, which is the

recognized field of research for physics and the philosophy
of nature, the mind abstracts from singular and individual
matter only.

The object which the mind presents to itself

can neither exist, nor be coneeived apart from or without
sensible matter.

The object studied is ens mobile, being

as subject to change.

Within the second degree, which is

the field of mathematics, the mind abstracts from sensible
matter, and the object considered is quantity, which cannot
exist apart from matter, but can be conceived apart from it.
Finally, within the third degree of abstraction, which is
the field of metaphysics, the mind abstracts from all matter,
and the object grasped is being as being, which cannot only
exist without matter, but can also be conceived without it7.
In each instance, the means for philosophical research is
governed by the range and limitations of the particular

7 This brief outline of the three degrees of abstraction
is a summary of a more complete exegesis found in maritain, la
Philosophic 0© La Mature, pp.. 12-14.
\
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degree of abstraction within which it is employed, and
results, in each case, in a type of knowledge with certain
definite characteristics.
The degree of abstraction determines the character
istics of the type of knowledge gained from ens mobile.
For as

Maritain has indicated, the philosophy of nature

resolves its concepts from intelligible being.

This know

ledge is the product of a type of ontological explication
open to the speculative intellect.

It is not connected

wit|i empiric conditions, but with reasons of being and
primary causes; and tries to discover the nature of things.
The philosophy of nature relies on experience much more
closely than does metaphysics, and must be prepared and able
to submit its judgments to the verification of the senses;
but it is a deductive apprehension which assigns reasons
and intelligible necessities in the degree to which it is
assured of the intrinsic constituents or the essence of its
object y

£

The philosophy of nature is able to gain a knowledge

/

Maritain, Les Deeres Du Savoir. p. 345» ”0*681 dans
l*etre intelligible lui-meme, si obombre qu*il soit par la
matidre sensible, qu *un tel savoir resout ses concepts, ils
ressortit a un type d*explication ontologique ouvert au mouvement natural de 1*intelligence speculative. Ce n*est pas aux
conditions erapiriques, e’eat aux raisons d ’etre et aux causes
propremerit dites qu*il s*attache; e ’est les essence des choses
qu’illveur decotivrir ... II depend de 1*experience d ’une fapon
plus contraignante que la mataphysique et doit pouvoir amener
ses jugements jusqu* a'la verification du sens, raais c*est un
savoir deduct if*, assignent les raisons et les ne'cessites in*?
telligibles dans la mesure ou il s* est assure du constitutif
intrinsdque ou de la quiddite de ses objets.”
'
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of the Intelligible aspect© of sensible reality which is
specifically distinct fro® the knowledge gained by the
natural sciences*

The scientist seeks to investigate ena

mobile from the point of view of its observational and
measurable characteristics, and he arrives at descriptive
knowledge such as the atomic theory.

The philosopher seeks

to investigate ens mobile, from the point of view of its in
telligible aspects and arrives fet essential knowledge such
as the hyloraorphlc theory.
When a philosopher begins a study of the problem of
change, in corporeal beings, he is confronted with certain
difficulties.

The first is the problem of the primary con

stitutive principles of ens mobile, a problem arising chiefly
from the difficulty of reconciling being as stable and
determinate, with being as dynamic and indeterminate.

From

observation, it can be seen that corporeal beings have inertia
and activity, extension and indivisibility; and permanence
and flux.

The question then arises as to what the intrinsic

causes are, that can account for these opposite properties
in ens mobile.

The philosophical atomists state that cor

poreal beings are essentially inert, and they chose to ignore
the intrinsic activity of corporeal beings.

The philosophical

dynamists on the other hand, choose to ignore the inherent
passivity of mobile beings, and state that corporeal
are essentially active.

eings

The integral position of the Aristo

telian- Thoraist explanation recognizes that corporeal beings
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are both active and passive.
Accordingly, as M. A'*arituin has enumerated, Aris
totelian philosophy recognises two substantial principles
in corporeal substances.

The one is prime matter of which

things arc made, which in itself is nothing actual; it is
a principle wholly indeterminate, incapable of separate
existence, but capable of existing in conjunction with some
thing else, which is the form*

The form is an active nrin-

ciple of corporeal substance which determines the purely
passive first matter^*

This doctrine which regards a body

as a compound of prime matter and substantial form is known
as hylomorphisHi*
Furthermore, the hylomorphic theory states that a
corporeal substance compounded of prime matter and substantial
form is a real substantial unity endowed with active and
passive powers, through which, by a tendency which is in
herent, it seeks to develop its own perfection.

It explains

the opposite characteristics of ens mobile by two principles

9 Maritain, "Introduction General® A La Philosophie",
Elements De Philosophic. I - 117* wLa philosophic d*Aris
totle 'reconna&t dans 'la substance corporelle deux principles
substantiels:
%
v
(1) la matiere (matieVe premiere).••ini pur "avec quo!” les
choses sont faites et qui par soi-nuhne n fest rien de fait, un
principe absolument Indetermine, incapable d*exister par luimeme, mais capable d*existor par autre chose (par "la forme").
{2) un principe actif, qui ©st c o m m l*idee viaante de la
chose, ou comas© son am® et qui determinant cette raatiere
premie're purement passive."
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which are incomplete and cannot exist separately*

It takes

into account both the dynamic and static properties of ens
mobile, and provides the means for the development of a
philosophical solution for many of the problems of sensible
reality.

Such a problem is substantial change,
Before this problem can be resolved into the primary

terms of hylomorphism, it is first necessary to distinguish
the various kinds of change.

Change is divided into four

species; substantial change or mutation which is the transi
tion from one being to another; qualitative change which is
alteration; change in quantity which is either augmentation
or diminution; and change in place which is latio or local
motion.

Substantial change or autatio is divided into

generatio and corruptio; "generatio est autatio de son subjecto in subjactum;" and, "corruptio est mutatio de subjecto
in non subjectum."-*-®

It is the *coming-into-being* of what

did not exist, and the reverse passage in non-being.

There

fore, substantial change is the transition of one being
Into another.
Through the development and application of the
primary principles of corporeal substance, which are prime
matter and substantial form, and the accidental principle of
mutation which is privation, the philosopher is able to give

Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Diaputatae De Veritate.
Q. 2d, lc (Taurini ft&lia!
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an explanation for substantial change.

Prime matter and

substantial form are real and necessary principles of being
in change, not ideal suppositions or mental constructs.
The first requirement for substantial change is a
subject.

The common subject is prime matter which is pure

potency.

As St, Thomas has staged, Momne quod generatur,

generatur ex aliquo, ut intellegltur id ex quo est gen®ratio
non privatio sed materia.

n

Prime matter is the common foun

dation that remains throughout the change,, Substantial
change is transmutation rather than creation and total anni
hilation.
The next requirement for substantial change is the
term of generation which is the substantial form.

It is

the principle of determination and the first act of prime
matter,

Just as in the case of prime matter, when mutation

occurs the substantial form does not suffer from generation
or corruption.

For, as St. Thomas has said, "foraae enim

proprie non flunt, sed edueuntur de potentia materiae” .^2
Thus, In substantial change, when a form Is acquired, it
is educed from the potency of the matter, and when a form
is lost, it reverts to the potency of the matter to reappear
anew whenever external conditions conspire to cause its

^

Aquinas, In VII Metaphys. lect. 1 (Cathala no. 761).

12 Ibid.. lect. 7, (Cathala no. 1423).
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reappearance*
Substantial change, presupposes in the subject which
passes to a new substantial act a capacity to this rather
than to another form, and also supposes in the subject a
lack of such suitable form*

The principle which signifies

this lack is privation, which is an accidental principle
of substantial change.

As St. Thomas has said, "materia

enira sub una forma existens habet in se privationem alterius
formae",

13

where "private non significat aliquam naturam in

subject© sed oraesupposit subjectum cum aptitudine."lk

Pri

vation indicates that prime matter is disposed to certain
perfections when the perfection is acquired privation dis
appears.

It is not the pure negation of fora but the negation

of substantial fora in a suitable subject and so is a real
principle.

When generation is completed, privation ceases.

Therefore, every substantial change in the universe
of mobile being requires something that remains through the
change.

This is prime matter.

Otherwise there would be a

constant annihilation and creation.

It requires something

new, substantially new, to which it tends while the old
form disappears, or it would not b® substantial change.
It also requires the privation of a new fora in a suitable

13 Aquinas, In 111 Metaphys,lect. 4 (Cathala no. 2470}.

Ik

Aquinas, In X Metaphva.iect.

6

(Cathala no. 2051).
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subject, otherwise there would not be sufficient reason
for the appearance of a new form.

The corruption of one

form is the generation of another, and conversely the
generation of one form is the corruption of another.
The preceding examination of substantial change
servos to illustrate that the operational technique of philo
sophy, or in this instance the philosophy of nature, provides
the means for the discovery of a real knowledge of the in
telligible aspects of sensible reality.

The philosopher be

gins his study with the facts of ordinary experience.

Once

he has grasped being, and apprehended certain necessary
principles, he is able to expand his investigation through
deductive argumentation.

Then, if the laws of logic have

been adhered to rigorously, the truths which he has dis
covered are as certain as the necessary and universal prin
ciples from which they have been derived, so that, as in
the case of the hylomorohic theory, he arrives at a certain
knowledge of things in their causes.

Herein lies the power

of philosophy.
The philosophy of nature cannot penetrate the diver
sities and specific particularities of the world of bodies.
Within the first degree of abstraction, which is the legi
timate orbit of the philosophy of nature, the essences of
sensible things are hidden, and corporeal substances are
rendered opaque, because of the element of resistance to
intelligibility which belongs to matter.

It is indeed
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possible to reach certain essential and specific determi
nations concerning man, but below man, the essences remain
hidden as to their specific natures.

True philosophical

certitudes are reached only in the distinction between
very widely extended spheres such as matter and form, or
living and non-living beings.
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CONCLUSIOU
Our study has revealed a clear-cut division be
tween those who recognize a distinction between the philo
sophy of nature and the natural sciences, and those who do
not.

The one group, made up of the pragmatists, the natural

ists, the dialectal materialists and their adherents, fail
to recognize the unique nature of traditional philosophy,
and reject it as an invalid product of an obsolete method.
They maintain that real knowledge is achieved by the experi
mental method alone.

Within this group the need for philo

sophical speculation is resolved through the construction
of systems which have their foundations resting upon the
most recent accepted scientific doctrines.

The other group,

made up of isaritain, Caldln, Owen, Thompson, and others,
who follow in the tradition of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas,
recognizes the value and purpose of traditional philosophy,
the value and accomplishments of the experimental sciences,
and the Incomplete picture of reality offered by either
science or philosophy when alone.

They seek to unify the

picture of reality and to restore order to the field of
knowledge.
One of the fundamental tenets to which the various
materialistic positions are anchored, is the premise that
it is iraposiible to probe reality to the point where the
79
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nature of things can be laid open to the mind.

Real know

ledge is limited to phenomena and to the methods of the natural
sciences.

This limited concept of knowledge provides the

major argument of this group against traditional philosophy.
In contrast to this position, the advocates of Thomisra main
tain that it is Indeed possible to gain a knowledge of
reality by a means quite distinct from the experimental
method.

The crux of the Thomistic position is that there

are two distinct and valid approaches to sensible reality,
namely the approach of the philosophy of nature, and that
of the natural sciences.
For Thomists, the philosophy of nature has its point
of initiation in the terms of observable data, but the mind
in its consideration of these, seeks for their inward nature
and intelligible reasons; it seeks to know what things are
in themselves.

The natural sciences, on the other hand,

never seek the ontological for itself, and so, the resolution
of concepts is made in an infra-philosophic direction.
What things are in themselves is not the point of interest;
what is important are the possibilities of empiric proof
and mensuration and the connecting together of the empirical
data according to certain stable laws.

Though the material

object of the philosophy of nature and the natural sciences
is the same, namely ens mobile, the formal object which
determines the specific nature of these Intellectual dis
ciplines is different.

The scientist studies the laws of
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phenomena, linking one observed instance to another, and
if he seeks the structure of matter, it is by representing
it to himself in terms of molecules, ions, and other similar
constructs, within a framework of time and space,

The

philosopher, on the other hand, seeks for what in fact
matter is, what the nature of corporeal substance is as a
function of intelligible being.
In his search for knowledge, the scientist moves
from the gisible to the visible, from the observable to the
observable.

The philosopher proceeds from the visible to

the invisible; to what in itself is outside the bounds of
all sensory observation.

The principles which are the aim

of the philosopher are pure objects of intellection, not of
sensible apprehension, or imaginative representation.

There

fore, there are two distinct valid approaches to the study
of sensible nature.

The one, the philosophy of nature,

studies sensible reality in an effort to seek out its in
telligible aspects, that is, it emphasises the ens of ens
mobile.

The other, the natural sciences, approach reality

in an effort to discover and correlate its observable and
measurable aspects, that is, it emphasises the mobile of ens
mobile.
Although the materialists deny the validity of the
philosophy of nature just as firmly as the Thomists affirm
it, there is no open dispute between these groups when it
is a question of the technique of the natural sciences.
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When the focal point of the problem shifts from the purely
technical aspects of the experimental sciences to the
nature and limitations of scientific knowledge, the con
flict arises again.

On the one side, the major materialists

are convinced that the experimental procedure provides the
only means for analysing all the problems which confront
humanity} and that the knowledge gained in this manner,
alone is accepted as valid and true.

On the other side,

the Thomists together with many major men of science, such
as Conant, Caldin, Owen, and Thompson, stand convinced that
the experimental method cannot come to basic conclusions in
regard to reality.
Although the advocates of the diverse kinds of
materialism have completely overruled traditional philosophy
as defunct and obsolete, they have been unable to obliterate
the pressing need for philosophical speculation.

As a con

sequence, they have been forced to search in science for
principles to serve as foundation® for their various scien
tific constructs.

In doing this they failed to recognise

that the success of science is due to its careful obser
vation of the limits expressed by its principles.

In its

legitimate operation, it confines itself to the quantitative
and mechanical, and does not presume to speak about spiritual
values and freedom; it understands that there are vast areas
that are beyond its scope.

Since this group was awed by the

accomplishwanta and prestige of science and worshipped it
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as omniscient and omnipotent and the bearer of man* s sal
vation, they adopted an attitude toward science which was
strictly unscientific.

To distinguish it from science

proper it has been termed scientolafcry or scientism.

Since

the limitations of the natural sciences are ignored, this
peculiarly modern form of idolatry claims the working
principles of science can be used as universal principles
in terms of which the whole of reality can be explained and
controlled*
Since Thomistid philosophy recognises the distinction
between philosophy and the natural sciences, it seeks to
restore order to human thought by applying each to its proper
part of reality.

The proper techniques of the experimental

procedure are admitted and applied to the quantitative and
mechanical aspects of reality.

But philosophy, not science,

is admitted as the proper means for the discovery of those
principles which enable the intellect to transcend the sen
sory order, and to deduce truths which pertain to the basic
principles of being.

Philosophy provide® the certitude

required for discovery and understanding of those fundamentals
of existence such as spirituality and freedom.

For, if the

laws of logic are adhered to rigorously, the truths disco
vered are as certain as the necessary and universal prin
ciples from which they have been derived.

An acceptance of

the philosophy of nature opens the way for the formation of
a real knowledge of the material world beyond the scope ofx
the experimental method.
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